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Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA




What we often describe as "contract law" is comprised of
heterogeneous clusters of case and statutory law pertaining to, and
differently describing, various contractual relationships. Many who
purport to study contract law and focus solely on the rules found
in the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") regarding the sale of
goods, or on the proposed rules of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, ignore this heterogeneity. However, in modern U.S. law,
contract law does not exist as a single, integrated whole in a
manner relevant to those engaged in commerce.' While there are
many common themes, the reality lies as much in differentiation as
in commonality.
This is important because we are currently in an era of turmoil
in contract law caused by fundamental change in the economy
from which contract law emerges.2 The turmoil is reflected in
substantive changes in how contracts are made and in the primary
subject matter of commercial contracts.3 The turmoil comes
* Reporter for the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act; Professor of Law,
University of Houston Law Center, J.D., 1968, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. "'One system of precedent' we may have, but it works in forty different ways." Karl
Liewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L REv. 205, 205 n. * (1934).
2. In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") is being redrafted. Two
new articles were added (Article 2A (Leases) and Article 4A (Funds Transfers)). Article 2A
was approved in 1987 and Article 4A was approved in 1989. Article 9 and virtually all other
Articles of the Code have been redrafted. A revision of Article 2 (Sales) is being considered.
3. In terms of methods of contracting, various states and countries have adopted rules
that clarify that electronic records and electronic signatures satisfy requirements from prior
law. A comprehensive listing of enacted and proposed legislation dealing with this subject
can be found at Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature Legislation
<http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce.htnl> (last modified Jan. 13, 20000). This listing includes
over 35 states with enacted legislation dealing with electronic or digital signatures. See also
RAYMOND T. NmMR, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ch. 14 (3d ed. 1997) (for a discussion
of several of the major statutes). Many of the state statutes have limited scope. However, a
number of states, including Utah, Washington, Illinois and Minnesota, and various countries
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primarily from the emergence of a new market economy.4
Transactions in this new environment differ from transactions in
the old, both in technique and in subject matter. Yet, older images
of contract and commercial practice continue to affect decisions of
legislators and courts.
We have changed from a goods-based economy to one that
substantially relies on transactions in digital information and
services. The fact that "information" is a primary subject matter of
commercial exchange is now a central reality of the economy.
Much of the contract law that developed in the 1940's and 1950's
was based on an image of sales of goods. During the 1960's, an
image of a "consumer" buyer was added and often wrongly
generalized to extend to all buyers of goods. While adequate for
their own purposes, these images do not fit contracts for licensed
access to a digital database, for use of network or communications
software, or for access to or use of other information assets.
The contract issues involved in creating, compiling, distributing,
and enabling the use of information entail different questions than
those involved in manufacturing and distributing hard goods. The
subject matter of such contracts is intangible; the property is
defined not by the law of goods but, rather, by control of computer
systems or property rights as defined by intellectual property law.
have enacted relatively comprehensive legislation that not only allows electronic signatures
to satisfy traditional writing and signature requirements, but also deals with the liability of
parties using and relying on digital signatures. Internationally, the European Union has
issued a proposed directive dealing with electronic signature issues, intending to forestall the
development of inconsistent national laws within the Union. See European Commission,
Proposed Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures - COM (1998) 297.
The mbc.com site lists 14 countries that have taken steps with respect to digital and
electronic signature laws, including relatively elaborate legislation in Germany, Italy, and
Singapore.
4. A related reshaping in law lies in changes in traditional intellectual property fields,
and especially those associated with copyright law. Included are changes in expanded
database protection in Europe and significant modifications in U.S. copyright law, including
limited statutory recognition of "moral rights," digital performance rights, and most recently
the enactment of expansive protections for digital monitoring and security devices that
augment copyright protection. All of the following have been enacted within the past decade:
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-121205 (Supp. IV 1998) (aspect of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
dealing with "copyright protection and management systems"); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994)
(protection from "unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and music
videos"); 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (1990) (protection of the rights to "attribution and integrity"
(so-called "moral rights") for certain works); 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1995) (right to exclusive
control digital audio transmission of a sound recording). See also COUNCIL AND EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT DIRECTIVE, ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES, 96/9/EC (1996) OJ L 77
(establishing new extraction rights with reference to otherwise unprotected content of a
database).
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The contractual relationships differ from those typical of the law of
goods. Examples of the most common transactions include
contracts for access to an online service or for a license of rights
in information.
This article discusses the question of: "what contract law applies
to computer information transactions?" The focus is not on the
substance of contract law, but on the various sources of applicable
contract law and the images they bring to the transaction. The
answer to this question is embedded in conflict, misperception, and
political debate. Contract law ideas today are dominated by
concepts from yesterday.
Part I briefly describes the relationship between contract law and
contract practice. Contract law fosters freedom of contract and
facilitates commercial relationships. This is sometimes over-ridden
by express regulation, but the basic principle is strikingly resilient
because it sets the basis for our market economy: contract choices
control unless there is a clear public interest need to curtail them.
As a result, general contract law rules serve only a background
function. They provide rules for commercial relationships, but only
when the agreement does not otherwise provide. The agreement,
not the law, controls. In that context, an appropriate body of
contract law should be adapted to the type of commerce involved
because it fills gaps when the parties are silent. The rules we
achieve, however, are shaped by the images that law-makers bring
to the task and often when the images are wrong, the rules are
wrong.
Part II discusses what law applies to computer iiformation
transactions. There we trace, through case law, various sources of
contract law. The overall contract law that emerges is complex,
characterized by divergent authorities and unclear or erratically
applied criteria. The policy issue is whether this complex and often
obscure law is appropriate now that computer information
transactions dominate large parts of the economy.
Within the complexity, one theme emerges. The images
associated with sales of goods law and consumerism have greatly
affected the development of modem contract law, including the law
relating to computer information transactions. This much would
have been obvious without great study. But the fact is that courts
often use the sales image for transactions that have little to do with
a title transfer of a tangible item to a buyer (the paradigm of a sale
of goods). Again, when the images are wrong, the results are often
wrong. When looked at from the vantage of the goods-centric
2000
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perspective in UCC Article 2, the world of contract law has often
been construed as a world differentiated between the sales of
goods and the sales of personal services. That image, never correct,
is even more clearly incorrect today as information transactions
emerge as a centerpiece of the economy.
The cases reveal not only a misperception by some courts, but
also recognition by many others that transactions in information
are different from goods. Overall, what is occurring is an
often-wrenching shift away from a world of contract law dominated
by images of the sale of goods to consumers. Sales of goods have
been at the forefront of the economy for years; they remain
important. Their law, represented by UCC Article 2, was drafted
specifically to carve out sales contracts from general contract law.
Contrary to that intent, this statute became a factor throughout all
contract law. Now that other subject matter has become important,
we must recognize that assumptions based on sales must be
reevaluated and replaced with images attuned to transactions in
digital information.
Part III discusses what the law relating to computer information
transactions may be in the future, with the focus on the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"). This uniform act
was promulgated in July of 1999 and sets out a contract law regime
for the information age with respect to computer information
transactions. Its contract law regime is based on a blend of
common law, intellectual property, and UCC concepts. The goal is
to provide coherent guidance relevant to the type of transactions
involved. Rather than deal with the details of UCITA, the focus is
on the general scope of the Act.
I. CONTRACT AND COMMERCE
A. Contract Law: Images of the Past
Contract law is comprised of generally applicable principles
providing umbrella themes linked to differentiated rules applicable
to different contract relationships. The general themes deal with
certain issues of contract formation and limited restrictions on
contract terms. These themes are not consistently applied among
the states. But that is the nature of common law, where individual
court decisions control.
Beneath the general themes, there are sub-themes and sub-fields.
This too is an outcome of common law, which encourages courts
Vol. 38:255
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to make distinctions based on subject matter and context. The
differentiation has been accentuated by statutory regulations that
distinguish, for example, among "commercial contracts," "consumer
goods," "credit contracts," and "transactions in securities." The
contract law to which courts turn in deciding the enforceability of
an employee contract is different from the law used in deciding the
enforceability of a real estate deed, which is different from the law
pertaining to the sale of a television set, and all three differ from
the law that governs licenses of information. The differentiation is
explicit in the UCC. The UCC contains transactional rules that give
extensive treatment to transactions in goods and selected financial
transactions, but which do not address other subject matter, even
though the other subject matter may be more significant in
commerce.
5
The efficacy of contract law in this context hinges on drawing
appropriate distinctions. This does not always occur; it is less likely
to occur after the economy undergoes a paradigm shift. Courts and
legislators often characterize issues based on their own experience
and the images from that experience. Yet, the images of the past
often mislead us. Llewellyn commented:
5. The question of when it is appropriate or useful to treat a body of related case and
statutory law as a field of contract or as suitable for inclusion in the conunercial code or
other body of uniform law is at best an inexact science. Llewellyn wrote:
Our fields of law, our patterns of legal thinking, our legal concepts, have grown up
each one around some 'type' of occurrence or transaction, felt as a typical something,
seen in due course as a legally significant type, and, as a type-picture, made a
standard and a norm for judging.
Karl Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L REV. 873, 880 (1939). The
first treatises on the law of sales did not appear until 1847. See generally W. STORY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1847); COLIN BLACKBURN, A TREATISE ON
THE EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PROPERTY AND POSSESSION IN
GOODS, WARES AND MERCHANDIZE (1847). Yet by 1940, the U.S. had already seen a uniform act
and a proposed revision of that act (Article 2).
This is very well, for it would be a very troublesome question, if anyone bothered to
look into it, just what the relationship between the "field" of contract and the "field"
of Sales might be, or indeed how a man can spot "a field" of law when he sees one,
anyhow, and figure out its relation to its neighbors. Enough for us at the moment that
Sales is supposed to center on the transfer of property in goods, and covers also
contracts which look to that end, and that it must be a field because there are books
about it .... But the presence of books, casebooks, and titles in encyclopedias would
seem to settle the matter. It is a field.
Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L REV. 725, 728-29 (1939). Elsewhere, I
discuss some of the criteria that indicate the desirability of following the course that
Llewellyn set. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes,
and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WNL & MARY L REV. 1337 (1994); Raymond T. Nimmer,
Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LoY. LA L REv. 725 (1993).
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[If] the stock intellectual equipment [(image)] is [inapt], it
takes extra art or intuition to get proper results with it.
Whereas if the stock intellectual equipment is apt, it takes
extra ineptitude to get sad results with it. And the work of the
artist, accomplished with poor intellectual equipment, is not
clearly intelligible to the inept reader. It does not talk to him,
it does not provide him tools, it does not help him to focus
issues.
6
In litigation, wrong images may lead to wrong judicial decisions. In
transactional contexts, this may be less important than other
consequences. Rules based on wrong images do not provide
guidance to those who plan transactions. A rule based on inapt
images does not "talk to" the reader and, if it does, forces the
reader to act to avoid the inappropriate effect of the rule.
B. Contract Law: Default Rules
At one level, the relationship between commercial contract law
and commercial practice is simple: contract law provides
background rules indicating how to create a contract and giving
terms of contract that apply if the parties do not otherwise agree.
General law also sets out limited rules about when the agreement
should not govern.
At a different level, dealing with how this affects actual
transactions, the relationship is complex. Contract law is a
practical discipline that contemplates an impact on transactions,
parties, and markets. We should evaluate it not on the basis of
whether the rules support correct litigation results when very few
contracts result in any litigation at all, but rather, based on whether
their impact on transactions is positive. Yet, the actual relationship
between contract law and contract practice is not well understood
and there is little reliable empirical data.7 We are not certain about
what happens in the black box that encompasses contract
negotiation and performance. However, there is one thing we do
6. Karl Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L REv. 873, 876 (1939).
7. Cf. Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L REV.
1 (discussing the results of a questionnaire about contract practices); Stewart Macauley,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
The theoretical constructs used in some literature refer to behavior in an abstract world that
does not correspond to actual, more complex transactional environments. See, e.g., Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE LJ. 729 (1992); Daniel Farber, Parody Losti Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic
History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA_ L REV. 397 (1997).
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know: given a rule of "contract choice" and the reality of a
marketplace with multiple options, contract law affects actual
transactions indirectly, rather than in a direct fashion. If they have
any effect at all, the rules are background factors for the
transaction, like the rules of property law. They might set a
bargaining point or indicate what language yields what result,8 but
the relative strength of law as contrasted to market preference,
market power, bargaining strategy, marketing choice, cost, timing
and other considerations is not known. I suspect that contract law
is not routinely the major consideration in contract practice.9
While some argue for background rules designed to alter
8. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729 (1992) (discussing the extent to which
theory can predict response in bargaining to default rules intended to shape contracting
behavior).
9. The relative strength of law as contrasted to other more tangible effects such as
market power, bargaining strategy, cost, and timing considerations remains largely unknown.
One illustration involves the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854). Law and economics scholars typically treat Hadley as a rule that sharply limits the
liability of a promisor for consequential damages in the event of breach. This is a "default"
rule in that the parties can contract for a different result. A number of authors have justified
this rule as a "penalty" or an "information forcing" rule that supposedly forces a promisee
concerned about a risk of extensive consequential loss in the event of breach to signal that
concern and seek to bargain around the default rule for contract terms that makes the
promisor liable for more extensive damages. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE UJ. 87 (1989); John
C. Coffee, The Mandatory/ Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 CoLuNt L REv. 1618, 1623 (1989); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default
Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 609-11 (1990). Arguably, this allows
the promisor to take a proper level of precautions in return for a higher price. But, while
this incentive may exist, it may be off-set by competing strategic considerations.
Furthermore, strategic considerations that focus on obtaining a better "bargain" are more
immediate and direct in the contracting party's contemplation than concerns about what rule
would apply in the event of non-performance, large loss, and resulting litigation. As Jason
Johnston notes,
if we are talking about bargaining over the contract, then we are talking about a
process of strategic information transmission, a process in which the promisee tries to
persuade the promisor that she cannot pay a high price, and the promisor tries to
persuade the promisee that she should. In this process, the promisee would generally
want to convince the promisor that her value from performance is low.
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE U. 615, 616-17 (1990). The promisee would not desire to communicate that
non-performance may inflict large loss. The world of commercial contracting in fact is
complex. What actually occurs in reference to consequential loss or other default rules must
be filtered through an understanding of that complexity and the uncertainty of prediction
that it creates. Generally stated, conceptual models of contract bargaining are always
inexact. "[R]elatively simple contractual settings can give rise to enormous complexity. While
... different default rules... would be theoretically efficient, our model shows that there is
small hope that lawmakers will be able to divine the efficient rule in practice." Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 8, at 733.
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contracting behavior, the complexity of the context argues against
this ever being successful. The dominant view is that the law
should allow contract choice and that, failing an agreed choice,
contract default rules should mesh with conventional practice in a
manner that projects a predictable result.10 Predictability means
predictable by parties engaged in the particular type of transaction.
This is not the same as saying that a party (or advocates for a
particular position) should receive what they would have wanted if
they had the inclination and bargaining power to achieve it in a
transaction. It cannot be asked or answered about individual
parties, but only about transacting parties generally involved in
such transactions from both perspectives.
Default rules of this type must be tailored to the commercial
context. Rules that are not so tailored increase costs because
parties must negotiate to eliminate their effect. Yet, if our image of
the context is wrong, the result will be wrong. Over fifty years ago,
Llewellyn argued that commercial contract law should be
developed by focusing on the particular commercial context in
order to develop rules of relevance and positive effect in that
context. The same holds true today. Then, the issues centered on a
transition from agrarian commerce to mercantile commerce in
manufactured goods. Now, contract law has a similar shift to
account for, but the recent transition is away from sales of
manufactured goods and toward subject matter that consists of
10. This is in contrast with rules that dictate terms and attempt to regulate commercial
behavior. As a matter of practice, default rules are most common in commercial contexts,
while "consumer law" contains many immutable rules designed to protect the consumer
against mercantile over-reaching.
11. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE U. 729 (1992); David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MiCH. L REv. 1815 (1991);
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH
L REV. 489 (1989); Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990). Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL L REv. 261, 266 (1985); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 V& L REv. 821, 822 (1992)
First, ... default rules (that reflect the conventional or commonsense understanding
existing in the relevant community] are likely to reflect the tacit... agreement of the
parties and thereby facilitate the social functions of consent. Second, when parties
have asymmetric access to the background rules of contract, enforcing conventionalist
default rules will reduce subjective disagreements by providing parties who are ...
informed of the background rules with an incentive to educate those parties who are
... ignorant of these rules.
Id. at 829.
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services or transactions relating to computer information.
II. WHAT LAW APPLIES
What is the current contract law for computer information
transactions? Initially, there is a bright line drawn between two
areas of contract law.
On one side of this line are rules of contract law that apply to
real estate transactions. This law, with its own terminology and
transactional requirements, split off early from other contract law;
over the years, it has proven remarkably resistant to influence by
other commercial contract law. Real estate law is embodied in
tailored statutory and tailored common law. There are some themes
common with contract law for goods and other subject matter, but
the dominant characteristic lies in the differences. Viewed from a
perspective of one comfortable with the UCC, real estate contract
law seems encrusted with old language, formalities, and concepts,
which seem arcane in a commercial world. Of course, real estate
law has been anything but stagnant and is characterized by
continuous, creative efforts to extract value from assets in new
ways. The same is true of all commercial law fields, but the
language and images are often starkly different outside real estate
transactions.
On the other side of the line, there is a multiplicity of subject
matter and commercial practice or expectations. Contract settings
here range from professional service agreements, to database
contracts, to franchise agreements, patent licenses, sales of goods,
airline tickets, stock brokerage, publishing, maintenance, leases,
rentals of motion pictures, licenses of software, bank deposit
agreements, access contracts for online services, loan agreements,
agreements to conduct surveys, cable television contracts, parking
lot agreements, cruise boat tickets, contracts for artistic
performances, and insurance contracts.
This diverse side of the line contains the contracts relevant to
the information economy. If we focus on computer information
transactions, the potential sources of contract law include:
* Sales of goods law
• Leases of goods law
* Bailment law
• Services contract law
* Professional services law





" Trade secret law
" Trademark law
" Licensing law
* Consumer protection state law
" Consumer protection federal law
• Tort negligence law,
" Negligent misrepresentation law
" Agency law
" Non-consumer state regulatory law
" Non-consumer federal regulatory law
" Miscellaneous other law
What does one make of this complexity? The answer is clear to any
lawyer who practices transactional law. The transactional lawyer
must contend with a mixture of laws applicable to any contractual
transaction. Almost all commercial transactions in every field are
"mixed transactions" in that multiple sources of contract law apply
to them.
A. Article 2 as an Influence
A dominant influence in many areas of contract law as compared
to regulation over the last fifty years comes from the law of sales
of goods in UCC Article 2. The degree of its influence varies
depending on the other subject matter involved and the coherence
of contract law rules designed for that other subject matter, but the
Article 2 influence has been pervasive. 2 It affects transactions
where courts treat the transaction as if it were a transaction in
goods when it is not, where courts apply the law of sales by
analogy to a transaction admittedly not a transaction in goods, and
by shaping views of what is appropriate common law for
transactions other than transactions in goods.13 Article 2 has
12. For example, the law of sales has had relatively little impact on real estate contract
law or on the law governing professional services agreements in law and medicine. See, e.g.,
McCombs v Southern Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
an operation to install a plate to stabilize the patient's spine was not a sale of goods); Pitler
v. Michael Reese Hosp., 415 N.E.2d 1255 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the UCC did not
apply to radiation treatments); In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Lit., 503 S.E.2d 445 (S.C.
1999) (holding that health care providers providing breast implants were not sellers of
goods). On the other hand, Article 2 has a broad impact on other services contracts.
13. See, e.g., Printers II, Inc. v. Professionals Pub., Inc., 615 F Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd on other grounds 784 E2d 141 (2d Cir. 1986); Telesaver, Inc. v. United States
Vol. 38:255
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become a major influence in modem contract law.
Why? One would like to say that it happened because Article 2
"got it right" for all commerce and all commercial contracts. But
that is clearly not true, nor is it what Llewellyn sought to achieve. 1
4
The goal was to tailor contract law for a particular type of
contract-sales of manufactured goods. Frankly, it is quite clear that
the Article 2 sale of goods model did not, and could not, "get it
right" for diverse contracts such as licensing agreements,
employment contracts, repair agreements, consulting contracts and
other commercial agreements that are important in commerce.
Article 2 did set a base for contract law regarding sales of
manufactured goods. That base was immediately reshaped for retail
consumer sales of goods by law outside of Article 2.15
In part, the dominance arose because, for most of its fifty years,
Article 2 was the only source of codified contract law. It contrasts
with uncertain and often conflicting common law. One could teach,
write, plan, and debate with respect to Article 2, knowing that it
had broad effect. Courts and litigants looking for a reference point
could use Article 2 with greater ease than the diverse and often
Transmission Sys., Inc., 687 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1988); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408
N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980).
14. A recent, very explicit illustration of this occurred in the ruling of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,
Inc., 170 F3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), where the court declined to apply the Article 2 concept
that delivery of goods pursuant to a contract for sale transfers title to the goods in a case
involving a license of computer software. Ownership was determined based on
considerations unrelated to the Article 2 concept. See also Milau Assoc. v. North Avenue Dev.
368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y 1977) (holding that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose was not applicable to contract for services); Board of Trustees v. Kennerly,
Slomonson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that a professional engineer
responsible for preparing specifications for plaintiff's lighting system and supervising its
installation was not subject to action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness; the
rendering of professional services not in a routine manner, but in plans and specifications
tailored to individual requirements so that they reflect the exercise of professional judgment,
is a personal service); R.J. Longo Const. Co., Inc. v. Transit America, Inc., 921 F. Supp 1295
(D. N.J. 1996) (holding that New Jersey law did not imply a warranty of fitness under the
UCC in a professional services contract between an engineer and a purchaser of railroad
cars). But see Minnesota in Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator
Co., 143 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1966) (stating that the warranty of fitness might apply in a
construction contract); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W2d 649 (N.D. 1977)
(stating that contracts involving the installation of an electrical system should not
automatically be held to be outside Article 2 of the UCC); Department of Transp. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 368 A.2d 888 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (applying a warranty of fitness,
but not under Article 2).
15. David W. Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. LleweUyn is the Hero of
the Piece; or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karls Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L REv. 139 (1970).
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incomplete or obscure common law. Also, sales, of course,
dominated the economy. Sales were the types of transaction with
which most of us were most familiar.
This being said, the new subject matter and new transactions
that emerged as major elements of the economy in the past two
decades have loosened the grip of Article 2.
* Many of sales rules are not pertinent to leases of goods,
which have become a major type of commercial contract.
Thus, Article 2A on leases of goods evolved.16 While it
follows some Article 2 rules, in many contexts Article 2A
is a tailored law to accommodate an image and practice
of leases, rather than sales.
17
" Many ideas of contracts in goods are not pertinent to
transactions in information or services, which are now a
predominant part of the economy. Thus, UCITA on
computer information transactions evolved.
18
More generally, modern cases that deal with the scope of Article 2
are increasingly alert to the fact that the law of sales is not
appropriate for transactions for services, the design of products, or
transfers of rights in information, and that the other subject matter
has a coequal claim to tailored contractual law as does the law of
sales. 19
B. Nature of Influence: General or Specific Rules
While Article 2 has a dominant role, we must distinguish between
general contract principles and specific contract law rules. A
limited number of general Article 2 concepts are broadly dominant
in contract law. A larger number of Article 2 rules that specify
details of a sale are less commonly applied outside true sales or
leases of goods; these include implied warranties, transfer of title,
tender of delivery, damages, risk of loss, statute of limitations,
16. See U.C.C. Article 2A, Prefatory Note (1998).
17. For example, while the warranty rules of Article 2A are parallel to Article 2
warranties (see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 and § 2A-212), Article 2A does not presume that title to
the goods passes to the lessee on delivery and Article 2A adopts much different rules for
determining damages in the event of breach (see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-528 and § 2-708).
18. See U.C.I.T.A, Prefatory Note (1999 Official Text).
19. See, e.g., Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A_, 56 F3d 427 (2d Cir. 1995);
Minnesota Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Machinery, Inc., 17 F Supp.2d 892 (D. Minn. 1998);
Stewart v. Lucero, 918 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1996); Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 845
P.2d 800 (N.M. 1992). Cf. Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Holst Blow Pipe Co., 980 F. Supp.
187 (W.D. Va. 1997) (involving a contract to design and deliver a furnace).
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statute of frauds, and the like.
1. Sales Law and General Contract Principles
Several ideas in Article 2 have become core modem contract law
with general relevance unrelated to details of a sale of goods. In
the 1950's, as to many of these issues, Article 2 led a revision to
the idea of the contract, more suited to a modem, flexible
commerce, than to the rigid concepts characterizing earlier
contract law.
When developed, Article 2 proposed a change in contract
formation rules which moved away from the rigidity of the
then-current common law requiring a mirror image of offer and
acceptance to form a contract.20 It affirmed, instead, a commercial
reality that contracts are often formed with open or conflicting
terms and that terms are developed over a period of time in a
process, rather than coming together at a single point in time.2
These rules are now "common law" in a number of states. 2 Of
course, Article 2 did not "get it right" in all respects on contract
formation, nor have all cases correctly followed its concepts.2 But
the idea of flexible, layered contracting in Article 2 influenced
common law courts and the Restatement, even though many courts
also get it wrong, reverting to a formalistic view of when contracts
are formed,24 and in many states, the "mirror image" rule and its
associated formalities remain embedded common law and applied
outside Article 2 and 2A.
What has been said about contract formation is also true about
some other general rules in Article 2 and Article 1 of the UCC. For
example, the UCC mandates interpretation of contracts based on
their practical context, rather than on the terms of the statute.2 5
20. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1998) (stating that a contract can be formed by a clear
acceptance, even if the acceptance contains terms that vary from the offer).
21. See, e.g., Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of Information
Contracts: The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 Hous. L REv. 195
(1999).
22. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.21 (2d ed. 1998).
23. U.C.C. § 2-207 is perhaps the classic case of a provision that did not, and generally
d es not, work in litigation. Of course, properly construed, that provision is one of the
linchpins of the entire flexible contract formation rules in Article 2.
24. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 E2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that a contract and all its terms were formed on -the placing of a telephone order with the
contract consisting largely of Article 2 default rules and that subsequently proposed terms
could not be part of the agreement unless agreed to as a modification).
25. See U.C.C. § 1-205.
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This requires that courts .look at the context of the agreement,
rather than the statute, to determine the relationship of the parties;
default rules apply only when the context gives no answer. When
properly used, this rule derogates from any idea that law controls:
it clearly states that the "agreement" controls and that the meaning
of an agreement is a contextual issue. This principle is as true for
services, information and other contracts as it is for sales.
UCC Article 1 provides that all contracts carry an obligation to
perform in "good faith."26 Article 2 provides that a court can
invalidate a contract term that is "unconscionable."2 7  These
substantive ideas are linked by a common perception that certain
over-riding obligations exist in contracting and contract
performance, which themes allow courts to invalidate instances of
over-reaching. Both themes are incorporated in the Restatement
and in common law in many, but not all, states.28 The doctrines are
narrow. "Good faith" does not provide a basis to contradict express
contract terms or rights. 29 The express terms of the agreement
control. Unconscionability claims are frequently rejected unless
circumstances entail procedural and substantive over-reaching.
Even within the UCC, these themes are not universally applied. For
instance, the unconscionability rule does not apply to Article 9
transactions.
Yet, in these and a few other contexts, Article 2 set out a "hub"
of basic rules with relevance beyond the sales of goods.
2. Sales Law as a Separate and Distinct Field
In contrast to the general rules we have discussed, Article 2 also
contains many rules tailored to the structure and expectations of a
sale. These rules, while sometimes applied in transactions that are
26. See U.C.C. § 2-103.
27. See U.C.C. § 2-302.
28. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACM § 208 (1979). The comments on this section
indicate a close correspondence to the treatment of this issue in the UCC. Id. at § 208, cmt.
d. Not all states follow the rule on good faith or unconscionability. See, e.g., McDonald's
Corp. v. Watson, 69 F.3d 36 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the rule does not apply, under
Illinois law, to a franchise agreement falling outside the UCC). Cf. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v.
John Deere Co., 510 F Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that under Pennsylvania law, the
good faith obligation from UCC applies even though Article 2 does not); Angus Medical Co.
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 173 Ariz. 159, 840 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. 1992) (unconscionability).
29. See McDonald's Corp. v. Watson, 69 F.3d at 36 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
terms of the contract govern); Kham & Nates Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908
F2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the good faith duty does not override the right to
enforce the terms of the contract). See generally PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOARD OF THE U.C.C.,
COMMENTARY No. 10 (regarding the scope and nature of the "good faith" obligation).
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facially unlike a sale, are more often limited in impact to actual
sales or, at least, transactions where sales of goods clearly
predominate.
There are many rules in this category that have been, perhaps,
extended to leases of goods, but not otherwise in contract law. For
example:
* Article 2 provides for a complex dance associated with
tender, inspection, and either acceptance or rejection of
the goods tendered pursuant to the sales contract. This
dance has been followed in Article 2A, but not in any
other area of contract law.
* Article 2 creates a "perfect tender" rule for when or if a
buyer can reject goods. This rule is followed in Article 2A,
but not in any other contract law field.
" Article 2 contains numerous rules about delivery or
shipment terms associated with carriers of goods. These
rules are not present in other contract law and, in fact,
conflict with modem international understanding even for
shipment of goods.
" Article 2 creates an implied warranty of merchantability if
the transaction involves a merchant seller. This rule is
followed in Article 2A, but not in other areas of contract
law.
" Article 2 establishes an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose in certain instances. This rule is
followed in Article 2A, but not in other contract law.
* Article 2 presumes that title to goods passes on delivery
to the buyer. Neither Article 2A nor other contract law
presumes a transfer of title as an ordinary part of a
transaction.
" Article 2 contains rules concerning risk of loss as to the
goods, which have no counterpart in general law.
" Article 2 sets out damage formulas associated with resale
or replacement of the particular item, but these rules are
not followed in other contract law, including Article 2A-
" Article 2 allows consequential damages only for the buyer,
while general contract law allows such recovery for either
party to a transaction.
The point is not that these rules are never applied to transactions
outside Article 2 or to subject matter included in a transaction that
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also includes Article 2 subject matter.3° The point is that Article 2
and Article 2A contain tailored contract laws suited to their own
context. For that context, the rules provide a relatively well-suited
base, while they may be entirely unsuited outside that particular
context.
An aspect of judicial decision-making needs to be considered
because it bears directly on the transactions to which Article 2
rules apply. This can be done by illustration.
Assume that Article 2 contains a rule for the sale of goods ("Rule
X") that does not exist in common law. Common law for a
particular type of contract contains a different rule ("Rule Y"). Now
let's suppose that a transaction occurred and a dispute reached the
court based on the issue associated with these two rules. If the
transaction is indisputably an Article 2 transaction, we hope that
the court will apply Rule X even if it believes that Rule Y is
preferable. Alternatively, Rule Y will apply if the transaction is
indisputably within the Rule Y subject matter. However, what result
if the transaction is nether a sale nor a Rule Y deal? There may be
an appropriate rule in existence for the particular type of
transaction. If not, a court might ask "which type of transaction is
this one most like," or it might ask "which rule do we believe
should apply"?
These two approaches are very different. One proceeds by
analogy (i.e., this is more like one than the other), while the other
focuses on outcome (i.e., this is the right result for these parties).
When the focus is on outcome, the choice can be implemented by
describing the transaction as an Article 2 sale (or not), or by
describing the transaction as one whose primary (predominant)
purpose is a sale of goods (or not).
In litigation, an outcome-focused analysis serves well if the
particular judge's preferred outcome corresponds to appropriate
policy.31  In planning transactions, a court's outcome-based
30. See, e.g., In re El Paso Refinery, LP., 196 B.R. 58 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 1996) (Article 2
analysis applied to determining damages in reference to a patent license); Angus Med. Co. v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 840 P.2d 1024, 1031-32 (Ariz. 1992) (unconscionability); World Enter.,
Inc. v. Midcoast Aviation Serv., Inc., 713 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (applies Article 2
rules on consequential damages, even though Article 2 does not generally apply to the
transaction).
31. Of course, a judge's ability to reach an appropriate decision depends on the judge's
reference point in approaching the particular issue. Views can often conflict, leaving choices
to vagaries of the particular judge. For example, compare the lower court and the appellate
court's view of appropriate application of the doctrine of unconscionability in the Integraph
case. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The lower court
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determination may be helpful or harmful for later transactions. It
may create costs and uncertainty. The preferable basis for
transactional law is a rule developed with a focus on the type of
transaction in general and the ordinary expectations associated
therewith.
C. The Mystical Case of Electricity and Article 2
Reported decisions on the "scope" of Article 2 often use analyses
that are driven by the court's desired outcome. One illustration is in
cases deciding whether an electricity services contract is an Article
2 sale of goods or a common law transaction. Viewed in the
abstract, there is little reason to suspect that a contract to deliver
electrical power is a sale of goods. True, electricity "moves" and,
thus, could vaguely be said to be within the broad Article 2
definition of goods (all things movable when identified to the
contract),32 but the nature of the transaction and the associated
expectations of the parties are so different from the sale of a car
that it is inappropriate to force the transaction into an Article 2
framework. Many Article 2 rules are irrational if applied to this
transaction. For example, how does one "inspect" electrical current
before "accepting" it and how does one accept or reject it? When
does title to electricity pass? Questions like these and the answers
that they conjure up indicate the inappropriateness of the sale of
goods model for electricity service.
Yet, when the issue was whether a transaction in electricity
carries an implied warranty of merchantability, several decisions
have held that, after it passes through the customer's meter,
electricity becomes goods for the purposes of Article 2 and a
product for the purposes of strict liability law.3 This creates a
mystical physical outcome. Electricity moving on wires that run
from the power plant to the customer's location is not goods, but
when delivered to the customer, it and the transaction are
transformed and governed by different contract law.
opinion, which makes for a study in diametric views of commerce, is reported at 3 F.
Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
32. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) defines "goods" as "all things that are moveable at the time of
their identification to the contract."
33. See, e g., Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290-91 (Cal. App. 3d
Dist. 1985) (in products liability context, electricity delivered to homes is a product); Hedges
v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 933, 935-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (not goods
before it passes the meter); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1972) (goods for purposes of warranty claim and statute of limitations).
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The core issue in such cases typically is whether the power
company should have an implied obligation related to losses caused
by unexpected surges in the power supplied to the customer.
Asking that question by asking whether electrical power contracts
are for a sale of goods misstates the point. The Massachusetts
court "got it right" (at least analytically) in New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc. v. Boston Edison Co.,3 where the issue was whether a
commercial customer could recover for breach of warranty when a
power surge caused a fire in its facility. The court concluded that
the true issue was whether the electricity company should have
liability for malfunctions in its services. The court held that this
was a legislative, not a judicial question, and dismissed the case.
Other courts might approach the issue as a common law question:
what, if any, implied obligations arise in tort or contract law in
electricity service agreements.
3 5
Judicial analyses that approach the issue as classifying the
contract as either goods, services, intangibles or, simply, electricity,
go in both directions on policy issues. Common law does not
generally support a merchantability warranty. A ruling that an
electricity service contract is not within Article 2 is in effect a
holding that there is no implied warranty of this type in that
transaction.m
On its face, excluding application of Article 2 seems correct. The
Article 2 warranty of merchantability focuses on the result of the
contract performance (i.e., the delivered product) and its quality. As
to electricity, such a focus would ask whether the particular group
of electrons delivered is consistent in character to electrons
delivered in ordinary electricity contracts. In these cases, however,
the issue typically is whether the provider is responsible for harm
caused by a power surge, that is, a variation in its ongoing
performance. This question is more analogous to questions about
what, if any, are the implied assurances about the quality and
34. 1996 WL 406673 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996).
35. See ZumBerge v. Northern States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 107-08 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (Article 2 issue not decided; issue resolved under negligence law); Wivagg v. Duquesne
Light Co., 420 UCC Rep. Serv. 597 (Pa. Ct. Comm. P1. 1975) (analysis suggesting that a
common law implied obligation may exist).
36. See, e.g., Lilley v. Cape Hatteras Elec. Membership Corp., 1990 WL 261819 (E.D.N.C.
1990) (not goods; warranty does not apply); Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590
N.YS.2d 628, 631 (App. Div. 1992) (not a product; breach of implied warranty claim
dismissed); Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1981) (not
goods; no warranty); Navarro County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1982) (not goods; merchantability warranty does not apply).
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nature of performance of services over time. States answer that
question differently for different types of services contracts, but at
least the latter question addresses the appropriate issue.
A ruling that electricity service contracts are transactions in
goods has ramifications outside the warranty issue and outside the
field of electricity. For electrical services, do other Article 2 rules
govern, including disclaimer rules, risk of loss, statute of frauds,
measure of damages, inspection, rejection, revocation, and the like?
For contracts not involving electrical service, what are the
consequences of equating electricity with goods? If electrical
current is goods, what of cable television service? Cable television
images move. If a cable contract is a sale of goods, is the content
of programming and availability of service judged by a standard of
merchantability?37 What about broadcast television or radio? Is a
contract for telephone service a sale of goods?38
The idea that a body of law focused on the contractual
relationship for the sale of a car or a toaster should govern these
transactions and other transactions in services and information is a
misuse of an important body of law. Yet, Article 2 has long had a
role beyond its original mandate.
D. Consumerism and Mass Market as an Image
Before moving to the question of what sources of contract law
shape the law related to computer information transactions, it is
useful to note a second general source of law that has had an
impact, albeit a more intermittent impact, on general law outside
its own scope. This is the idea of consumerism (or consumer
protection).
Article 2 has few consumer protection rules. Indeed, that was a
major complaint when Article 2 was promulgated. 39 It was an
37. For a case answering "no" to both questions, see Kaplan v. Cablevision of PA, Inc.,
671 A.2d 716, 722-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
558 A.2d 419, 423-24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (not a transaction in goods and thus no
warranty basis for claim that defects in distribution system prevented electricity from
reachng customer's meter).
38. See Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co., 522 A.2d 584, 586-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that
the use of a pay telephone was not a transaction in goods even though it involved some
provision of communications because the predominant purpose involved transmission of
customer-provided communications); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecomm. & Info.
Sys., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
39. David W Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. LleweUyn is the Hero of
the Piece; of Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C.
INDUS. & Comm. L REV. 139, 139-41 (1970).
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intentional omission; Article 2 focuses on general commercial
contract law, rather than on being a consumer protection code.
40
Shortly after Article 2 was adopted by the states, states adopted
positions on consumer protection. Some broadly regulated
consumer contracts, while others created incentives and
opportunities for litigation, and others did very little. The result
varies among the states and has varied over time within each state.
In the United States, consumer contract protection is addressed in
a largely non-uniform manner; each state has its own policy.
If we step back from details, a general observation can be
illuminating.41 The idea of consumerism combined with the images
of a mass market for tangible products has become a powerful
image with impact beyond its true scope. The core premise of this
image is that individual consumers lack sophistication, interest, and
bargaining leverage to protect themselves. As a result, law should
intervene to ensure balance or, at least, to require disclosures
understandable for the consumer. Mass-market goods so dominate
our personal experience that the images of consumerism influence
contract law generally. In this expanded version, the image is that
the buyer of goods is subservient and needs protection, while the
seller dominates in leverage and legal sophistication. This image
derives from a world of retail sales. In a commercial market, the
image of routinely subservient buyers is inaccurate. The
information marketplace accentuates the inaccuracy. Most
providers of information to publishers are individuals dealing with
large corporate purchasers. In the software industry, the average
software provider has fewer than 12 employees.42 These companies
routinely deal with Fortune 1000 clients. In commercial
transactions generally, it is as likely that the purchaser is more
40. UCITA adopts the same approach for the same reason. Because it was promulgated
against a background of widespread, existing state consumer protection law, UCITA
expressly preserves all existing state consumer protection statutes and regulations, except
with respect to four limited issues pertaining to electronic commerce. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105
(1999).
41. As might be expected, in the revision projects related to the generally applicable
UCC articles, the conflict between consumer protection rules and the goal of designing an
appropriate commercial code has been sharp and extensive. See Gail Hillebrand, the Uniform
Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75
WASH. U. LQ. 69 (1997); Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper
Formula, 75 WASH. U. LQ. 187 (1997); Mary Jo Dively & Donald Cohn, Treatment of the
Consumer under Proposed Article 2B, 16 J. MARSH. J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 315 (1997).
42. See AMERICAN ELEcRONics ASSOCIATION AND NASDAQ, CYBERNATION, THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE HIGH-TECHONOLOGY INDUSTRY TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1998); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE OUTLOOK 24-28 (1998).
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sophisticated as it is that the vendor dominates.
Rules informed by consumerism make little sense applied to
large corporate buyers. Yet, that happens under a number of federal
and states' laws. For example, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act gives a right to treble damages for aggrieved "consumers."43
Originally, it defined "consumer" to include any entity that acquired
goods or services. After years of controversy, the definition was
refined to define consumer as any entity with assets of less than
$25 million. The California version of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) contains many consumer protections, but
adopted these rules to apply to consumer and , commercial
agreements." The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act covers transactions
in "consumer products," which are goods of a type normally used
for consumer purposes regardless of who the actual purchaser is.
45
It thus imposes description and disclosure rules in a transaction
between IBM and Ford. UCITA identifies some transactions as
"mass-market transactions" and applies protective rules even if the
transferee is not a consumer.
46
The penetration of consumerism into merchant-merchant
(commercial) law can be shown in many ways, one being the
treatment of "standard forms." Viewed with a focus on a consumer
market, standard form contracts epitomize the imbalance between
consumers and sellers. The form is presented to the buyer and no
bargaining is permitted. In fact, this occurs only in the relatively
few consumer transactions that actually involve contract terms in a
record. But standard forms are more common in deals between
merchants. Here, the prevalence of forms is a by-product of
efficiency concerns: it is too costly and unproductive to negotiate
each and every contract term, even in many that involve large
dollar amounts.
47
There are competing views about the validity of standard forms
43. See TEx Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §17.45(4) (West 1984) (defining "consumer" to
include both individuals and businesses, but only businesses with assets of under $25
million). See generally Nancy Atlas, Scott Atlas & Raymond Nimmer, DTPA in the Courts:
Two Empirical Studies and a Proposal for Change, 21 ST. MARY's U. 609 (1990) (describing
the outcome of a study of trial court decisions under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act).
44. See Cal . Civ. Code § 1633.1-.17 (1999).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1998).
46. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 102, 209 (1999).
47. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HAZv. L. REv. 529, 529-30 (1971) (stating that standard form contracts
"account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made" and that their
"predonance... is the best evidence of their necessity").
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in modem law. One, built in part on consumerism images, assumes
that whenever a standard form is used, it results from economic
imbalance and justifies rules restricting its enforcement or allowing
courts to invalidate its terms.48 This approach, as adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts in 1971, is not restricted to
consumer contracts and has been followed in only a handful of
states. 49 The alternative approach, built on an image of contract
choice, posits that standard forms should be treated no differently
than any other written agreement. There is widespread but not
universal support for this approach in commercial contracts.50
The image one brings to discussing contract law is important.
Few would argue that there is a need to regulate, on other than
antitrust bases, the terms of a standard form used between
Citibank and General Motors, or IBM and Exxon. On the other
hand, many argue for oversight of a standard form in a contract
between a retailer and a consumer. The images of imbalance are
strong in the latter case. These images become misleading when
extended to the commercial context.
A rule based on a consumerism image that assumes the
dominance of the seller makes little sense in many transactions
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979). This approach, however,
does not stem solely from a mass market image. It also comes from a perspective on what
should be the proper relationship between a court and the terms of the contract in cases of
litigation. Stated simply, it flows from the view that judicial oversight of the terms of a
contract (including most particularly a standard form) should be encouraged in order to
avoid over-reaching and unfair surprise. The most commercially expansive illustration of this
approach is found in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contract Law
Article 2.19 (1994).
49. See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. LQ. 315
(1997).
50. See, e.g., Klos v. Poiske Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1998).
The concept of adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden
of contract enforcement. At the very least, it represents a serious challenge to
orthodox contract law that a contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the
objective manifestation of the parties' intent .... It may not be invoked to trump the
clear language of the agreement unless there is a disturbing showing of unfairness,
undue oppression, or unconscionability.
Id. at 168-69; Fireman's Fund Ins. v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1998);
Chan v. Adventurer Cruises, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1997); Dillard v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1992); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of
Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1251 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990); American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (contract of
adhesion fully enforceable in the absence of showing of unconscionability); E.H. Ashley &
Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 907 F2d 1274, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1990); Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981). Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L REv. 1173 (1983) (raising questions about the desirability of
enforcing standard forms).
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involving information. Unlike for goods, where large capital and
distribution systems are important, in information industries small
companies often thrive and, indeed, small companies and individual
entrepreneurs dominate many industry sectors. The average size of
an Internet provider is unknown, but the media allows single
entrepreneurs to become international businesses. Between two
individuals, one a licensee and the other a licensor, it is not
immediately clear why contract law should intervene in and
regulate their transaction or, if it did, to whom the benefit should
be extended.
E. Current Law on Computer Information Transactions
What then is the current law pertaining to computer information
transactions?
The answer to this type of question is complex in any setting. In
computer information transactions, the answer is not only complex,
but uncertain, varying across the states and, often, within a state. It
is made more uncertain by the fact that we are undergoing a
paradigm shift in how business is conducted and what subject
matter is central to commerce. Given that computer information is
at the center of the modern economy, this uncertainty is
inappropriate and fails to establish a coherent infrastructure for a
significant part of our economy. Courts may get specific decisions
right, but as a whole, law fails to provide guidance for transactions
in this crucial subject matter.
We can look at this problem from three different angles. The first
two concern how courts address the question--do courts start with
the view that Article 2 might apply, or do courts start with the view
that intellectual property and licensing laws apply? What difference
does this make? The third angle concerns how decisions about
particular types of information-related transactions deal with what
law governs.
1. Viewed From the Perspective of Article 2 Scope
If you look at the issue from a perspective grounded in sales law,
the analytical framework has several identifiable features. From
this vantage, the question is seen as a matter of defining the scope
of Article 2. There are four issues discussed in the decisions:
* First, is the entire subject matter comprised of "goods"? In
some cases, such as with respect to electricity, a decision
that a transaction involves "goods" has no clear relationship
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to what in common understanding is within the idea of
"goods." (classification)
" Second, if a transaction involves "goods" and another
subject matter, most courts ask whether the "goods" or the
"other" subject matter predominates. If the goods are the
predominant purpose, Article 2 applies to the entire
transaction, including subject matter that is "not goods."
(predominant purpose)
" Third, if Article 2 does not apply, some courts ask whether
Article 2 rules apply to things "not goods" by analogy, as
defining common law. The issue is whether common law
should fit Article 2. (analogy)
" Fourth, if all else fails, common law applies. (not goods)
This sequence reflects a goods-centric approach under which
contract law is presumably governed by sales law, unless another
body of law clearly must control. The goods-centric model is
increasingly irrelevant in our economy where information and
services dominate.
a. The Predominant Purpose Test
In litigation regarding the scope of Article 2, the most frequently
occurring issue is: how should a court handle a mixed transaction
covering both goods and other subject matter. The most commonly
used test asks what is the predominant purpose of the
transaction.5' If goods are the predominant purpose of the
transaction, Article 2 applies to the entire transaction, while if the
other subject matter is the predominant purpose, Article 2 does not
apply at all. This test creates a coherent framework after a decision
is made on the purpose test, but this test also ensures that in all
cases when it is used, the wrong law will be applied to some
aspects of a transaction (e.g., goods law applied to services aspects
of a mixed transaction). It is a test born in and suited for litigation,
not transactions. To the extent that the outcome of applying the
test cannot be predicted in advance, however, it leaves transacting
parties with no guidance about what law applies, forcing either
risk-taking or the cost of making contract terms to account for
51. See, e.g., Princess Cruises, Inc. v General Elec. Co., 143 F3d 828, 832-34 (4th Cir.
1998); Design Data Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 503 N.W.2d 552, 556-57 (Neb. 1993);
Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 845 P.2d 800, 803-04 (N.M. 1992); Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713, 714-15 (Ohio Mun. 1986); Tacoma Athletic Club, Inc. v.
Indoor Comfort Sys., Inc., 902 P2d 175, 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
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known contingencies.
The predominant purpose test is widely used, but when we look
at the issue broadly, the predominant purpose test is not the only
legal standard that courts use, nor even the one that is most often
used. For example, there are no decisions that use a predominant
purpose test to exclude application of laws such as the law of
negotiable instruments, letters of credit, security interests, and
other discrete contract law rules. The law on these subjects is
routinely assumed to govern its own subject matter, even if goods
are dominant in the overall transaction. The predominant purpose
test actually focuses only on general contract law. Even there, a
minority of courts reject it and use what some describe as a
gravamen of the action test, where what law applies depends on
the issue addressed: each body of law applies to its own subject
matter.52
In information transactions, the predominant purpose test is
often simply ignored in regard to certain issues. For example,
courts that have asked whether "informational content" is governed
by the Article 2 merchantability warranty because it is contained in
a book or on a diskette, ignore the predominant purpose issue.
"Informational content" is information intended in the ordinary
course to be communicated to an individual.5 This term includes
the images of a motion picture, the sounds of recorded music, the
text of a book, and the like. Here, there are strong policy interests
for not imposing liability for defects in the absence of provable
fault.M A court using a goods-centric analysis could conclude that
the predominant purpose of buying a book or a digital work was
goods. A predominant purpose analysis that concludes that a sale
of a book or a digital encyclopedia is predominantly a transaction
in goods would apply a warranty of merchantability to the content.
As we see later, in other contexts, some courts fall into this type of
trap. The court in Cardozo v. True,55 however, avoided the problem
by limiting the implied warranty to the paper and binding of a book
and excluding the informational content.
[W]e hold that absent allegations that a book seller knew that
there was reason to warn the public as to the contents of a
52. See Elkins Manor Assoc. v. Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc., 396 S.E.2d 463, 469-70
(W. Va, 1990) (declining to apply the predominant purpose test).
53. U.C.I.T.A. § 102 (1999).
54. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991). See
U.C.I.T.A. § 404 (1999).
55. 342 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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book, the implied warranty in respect to sale of books by a
merchant who regularly sells them is limited to a warranty of
the physical properties of such books and does not extend to
the material communicated by the book's author or publisher.
This does not absolve the provider of all responsibility in contract,
but excludes any implied warranty based on an analogy to an
Article 2 sale of goods for the simple contractual transfer.5 7 Some
courts seem to go even further to protect the seller.s
Under cases such as Cardozo, transactions involving
informational content are found to entail a mixed transaction for
the purpose of applying the warranty rules. UCITA brings both the
informational content and the media (the copy) into the scope of a
single act, but provides rules that reflect the policies underlying
Cardozo and similar cases.5 9
b. Goods-Services as an Incomplete Framework
When the predominant purpose test is used, the most important
question is how one determines what part of the transaction
predominates. The case law on this issue is unpredictable. One
pattern, however, emerged early and continues to have an
influence. That pattern involves defining the question as a choice
between goods and services as the dominant purpose. Indeed, some
describe the predominant purpose test as a goods-services test.
This dichotomy ignores information and informational rights; that
analytical mistake has significance in the modern information
economy. Courts using the goods-services dichotomy sometimes
reach wrong results and other times use inept language. The results
can be surprising.60 Treating this as the relevant dichotomy, for
56. Cardozo, 342 So.2d at 1057.
57. See also Gilmer v Buena Vista Home Video, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Ark. 1996).
Plaintiff does not complain in any respect about the physical properties of the film or
the covers as opposed to the ideas, thoughts, or images contained thereon. There is
no allegation that the videos contained physical defects. Rather, plaintiffs complaint is
that the videos and/or the covers contain offensive or morally unfit images or
messages. However, plaintiff does allege that BVHV, in promoting and marketing the
videos, warranted that they were suitable for viewing by children despite its
knowledge at the time of marketing that the videos contained subliminal messages.
Id. at 671.
58. See, e.g., Winter, 938 F.2d at 1033.
59. See U.C.I.T.A_ § 102 (1999) (defining computer information).
60. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991) (dealing with
whether Southwestern Bell breached a warranty by failing to include all contracted for
"advertising" in its yellow pages; the case was argued, in part, as a sales of goods case, but
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example, leads some courts to ask whether a license of software is
a transaction in services, a question that leads to treating software
as a transaction in goods because no services are involved. 61 Asking
the question this way also ignores the fact that, in many cases, like
with books and motion pictures, the purpose is to transfer
information and rights in information. Obtaining a diskette,
however valuable the plastic, is not the primary purpose of a
software transaction.
2
Not all courts coming to the issue from a goods-centric position
ignore the fact that information and informational rights may
predominate. When courts recognize that there is more than goods
and services in the economy, however, the language used in their
decisions often reveals the difficulty of the transition to modem
commerce. Although it did not deal with the scope of Article 2, this
difficulty was clear in Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd.63 In Snyder, the
issue was whether a supplier of designs, technical advice and
drawings along with a license to operate a process for converting
solid zinc into zinc dust was liable for the death of an employee
caused by operation of the plant constructed pursuant to the plans.
Following a conventional goods-services dichotomy analysis, the
court held that the transaction was not a transaction in goods, but
a transaction in services that did not come under product liability
law. However; in expressing its analysis, the court at least
acknowledged the role of information in the transaction. For
example, the trial judge commented:
[ISC] cannot be held liable for breach of warranty because this
theory of recovery is inapplicable to ideas, information and
services. The concept of breach of warranty stems from
the Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the publication of advertising
was a services contract); Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 458 N.E.2d 1027 (IlM. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that a contract for the printing of magazines was a contract for goods
because the intent was delivery of finished copies).
61. See, e.g., BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a contract to "design, fabricate, debug/test and supervise Field installation and
start up of equipment to automate [production of eyeglass lenses]" was more a contract for
goods than one for services); Neilson Business Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo V. Monteleone, 524
A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987) (holding that a turnkey hardware and software system contract was a
contract for the sale of goods).
62. As reflected in UCITA, however, this does not mean that warranty and other rules
analogous to those in Article 2 or 2A may not be appropriate to some aspects of the
computer information transaction. For example, for computer programs, UCITA adopts an
implied warranty of merchantability analogous to that found in Article 2. See U.C.I.T.A_ § 403
(1999).
63. 772 E Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
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Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code [which] governs the
sale of goods . . . . I have already decided that ISC sold
services rather than products.6
Was the Snyder transaction a services contract or something
different from either services or goods? The court came closer to
the mark when it stated:
Obviously, what ISC sold here - information - did not reach
the decedents in substantially the same condition in which it
was sold. That information did not cause them injury. [The]
injury causing instrumentality, although derived from [the]
-plans, had an existence completely separate and independent.
* . . Thus, when ISC relinquished control over the item it sold
- namely the plans- - the thing that ultimately caused
decedents' deaths did not yet exist.
65
The court thus blended a characterization of a license as a services
contract and as a contract relating to information.6 A court
approaching this case from the perspective of intellectual property
licensing would not have been concerned about whether this
license was a services contract. It would simply observe that the
transaction involved a license of information.6 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability expressly recognizes that
information is treated differently than tangible products for
purposes of product liability. 8
Increasingly, courts approaching the issue as one of determining
64. Snyder, 772 F Supp. at 244 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. See also In re North American Liesure Corp., 468 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding
that a contract to produce cassettes from a master was not a contract for the sale of goods);
R.J. Longo Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transit Am. Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1295 (D. N.J. 1996) (holding that
a license of a design was not covered by UCC Article 2); Alesayi Beverage Corp. v. Canada
Dry Corp., 947 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a license was a "services" contract).
67. See McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKs § 18:74 (1996). See also Burkert v. Petrol Plus of
Naugatuck, 579 A 2d 26 (Conn. 1990).
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Toms: PRODUCTS IABILrTY § 19, cmt. d (Proposed Final
Draft, 1997) (limiting the definition of product to "tangible personal property"). The comment
states:
[Where plaintiffs] seek to recover against publishers in strict liability in tort based on
product defect . . . [a]lthough a tangible. medium such as a book, itself clearly a
product, delivers the information, the plaintiffs grievance in such cases is with the
information, not with the tangible medium. Most courts, expressing concern that
imposing strict liability for the dissemination of false and defective information would
significantly impinge on free speech have, appropriately, refused to impose strict
products liability in these cases.
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the scope of Article 2 recognize that there is more subject matter
in commercial transactions than simply goods or services. This is
clear in cases involving contracts for the sale of a business. Here,
courts have long asked whether the predominant purpose focused
on tangibles (goods) or intangibles (information and rights, such as
copyrights, licenses, goodwill, patents).69  Sometimes goods
dominate, while sometimes the intangibles dominate.
For example, Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,70 held
that Article 2 did not apply when, in the sale of a business, two
assets that were not goods-a five-year non-competition agreement
and various drawings and tracings-accounted for over half of the
purchase price of the business. The fact that the drawings were in
tangible form (on paper) did not indicate that their value consisted
of goods, as compared to the information and the right to use it. As
the court noted: "The significance of these items in this transaction
is not their physical properties, but the ideas conveyed therein."
Indeed, in the contract list of the value allocated to each of the
major assets, the drawings were listed as the most valuable asset in
the over eight million dollar transaction.
Similarly, Stewart v. Lucero71 held that the sale of a catalogue
business operated under the Sears trademark by a license from
Sears was not a sale of goods. The court noted that:
The sale of any business may involve the transfer of goods in
the form of inventory, office equipment, and other movables
... . In this case, however, any such transfer was merely
incidental. The record discloses that Sears Catalog Sales
Merchants retained no inventory other than a few display
items and customer orders waiting to be picked up. Further,
the sales agreement and the merchant agreement demonstrate
that the basis of the [bargain] was the right to operate a
catalog business using the Sears name and a noncompetition
agreement from the [sellers]. These items are non-goods, and
... Article 2 ... is inapplicable. 72
69. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lucerno, 918 P2d 1 (N.M. 1996) (predominant assets were
intangible); Monarch Photo, Inc. v. Qualex, Inc., 935 F Supp. 1028 (D. N.D. 1996) (sale of
business involved predominantly intangible assets).
70. 602 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1985). See also United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251
F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D. N.H. 1966) ("[Blue prints, drawings etc., in reality the visual
reproductions on paper of engineering concepts, ideas and principles, are general intangibles
... not 'goods' [under] the Code.").
71. 918 E2d 1 (N.M. 1996).
72. Stewart, 918 P.2d at 3.
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The chief asset in Stewart was a license, which the court quite
properly described as "not goods" and which certainly was "not
services."
Decisions such as Stewart and Dravo show that courts are
capable of getting the issue right when intangibles, such as
information, informational rights, and licenses of information, are
involved even if the case is approached as defining the scope of
Article 2. Whether a predominant purpose test should ever apply
with respect to information and informational assets and their
relation to Article 2 law is a difficult question. As cases involving
informational content suggest, there are instances where this is not
appropriate if it leads to including the information within Article 2.
UCITA proposes that, with respect to the relationship between
goods and computer information as subject matter of a transaction,
a gravamen of the action standard applies, rather than a
predominant purpose test, because the contract issues merit
different treatment in law.73 Whether the predominant purpose test
should be followed or not, it is clear that, if applied, the test must
be used in a manner that gives recognition to information and
other intangible subject matter, which can be and often is the
predominant purpose of modem information transactions.
c. Applying the Predominant Purpose Test
How does one determine what purpose predominates in a
transaction?
Predictably, the cases are difficult to reconcile and the criteria
for decision often seem to lie in instinctive, rather than reasoned
choices by a court. This, in itself, creates a problem. Yet, there are
several patterns that can be usefully identified.
One concerns the importance attached to the fact that something
tangible is delivered from the provider to the other party. If the
contract does not require that the provider deliver something to the
other party, the transaction is not likely to be treated as a contract
in goods. There is no movable corpus to which the idea of "goods"
can attach. Similarly, many cases indicate that, if what the provider
is required to deliver are goods previously delivered to it by the
other party, the transaction is not a sale of goods, but rather
services or a lease. 74
73. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(b) (1999).
74. See, e.g., BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998)
(applying predominant factor test, a contract to "design, fabricate, debug/test and supervise
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But does the fact that the provider is required to deliver
something tangible to the other party indicate that the predominant
purpose of the transaction focuses on the "goods" thus delivered?
The answer should be no. There are many cases in which a
services or an information contract involves delivery of something
in tangible form, but that does not alter the nature of the deal. As
the court in Dravo recognized, the fact that drawings are recorded
on paper does not mean that the primary value lies in the paper,
rather than in the ideas and information. To see that even more
clearly, we need ask whether an attorney who drafts a will for a
client and delivers it on paper or diskette engaged in a sale of
goods (the will on the diskette). The answer is no, the purpose is
to obtain the professional services. An architect or engineer who
delivers written designs to a client with a right to use those designs
is not selling goods, but providing services, information and a
license of information.
7 5
Yet, while mere delivery of something tangible should not resolve
what is the predominant focus of the transaction, there are many
courts that seem to assume that the reverse is true for computer
information and other transactions, i.e. equating the existence of a
"deliverable" with the conclusion that goods are the predominant
purpose of the transaction. Sometimes the analysis is painfully
explicit and inadequate. For example, Advent Systems Limited v.
Unisys Corp.76 held that a distribution license for software was
governed by Article 2 under the predominant purpose test. The
court described a computer program as instructions to operate a
computer.77 It described "software" as "the medium" that stores
field installation and start up of equipment to automate [production of eyeglass lenses]" was
more a contract for goods than one for services because: (1) it was captioned "Purchase
Order," (2) parties were described as "Buyer" and "Seller," (3) it involved the sale of
equipment; and (4) payment was pegged to delivery of the equipment, not to the completion
of required services); Nim Plastics Corp. v. Standex Int'l Corp., 11 F Supp.2d 1003 (N.D. Ill.
1998); Manes Org., Inc. v. Standard Dyeing & Finishing Co., 472 F Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F Supp. 364 (E.D. Va. 1979); Insu-Mark Midwest, Inc. v.
Modem Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 550 (Ind. 1993); Mail Concepts, Inc. v. Foote & Davies,
Inc., 409 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). But see Vitromar Piece Dye Works v. Lawrence of
London, Ltd., 256 N.E.2d 135 (Il. Ct. App. 1969) (applying Article 2 to a processing contract
without discussion of the scope issue).
75. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Saco v. General Elec. Co., 779 F Supp. 186 (D. Me. 1991);
Minnesota Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Machinery, Inc., 17 F Supp.2d 892 (D. Minn. 1998);
Board of Trustees v. Kennerly, Slomonson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979).
76. 925 F2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
77. Advent Systems, 925 F2d at 674 ("In simplistic terms, programs are codes prepared
by a proganmer that instruct the computer to perform certain functions.").
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data and computer programs, stating: "The medium includes hard
disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tapes." 8 According to the court,
when a program is "transposed onto a medium," it becomes
"software;" that is, it becomes the medium itself.79 This is like
saying that, when printed, the text of a book becomes the paper.
Given that theory, the court stated:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process,
but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to
computer owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc
recording of an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by
the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a "good," but when
transferred to a laser-readable disc becomes a readily
merchantable commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers
a lecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it
becomes a good.
That a computer program may be copyrightable . . . does not
alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disk or other
medium, the program is tangible, movable and available in.the
marketplace [and therefore goods],80
But, of course, as we have seen, other courts dealing with
information on media treat the physical material as goods, but do
not treat the information as goods. The program is not the floppy
disk any more than a work of authorship is the paper and binding
of a book.
The substantive result in Advent Systems was that the
distribution license was enforceable under Article 2 even though it
failed to state a quantity term. This result may have been correct,
but it could have been reached under common law and the court's
analysis forcing this into an Article 2 framework is far off the
mark.81 Even under a predominant purpose test, the question
should have been whether the predominant purpose was to obtain
diskettes (if any were obtained) or a right (license) to distribute
software (the program, not the diskette). For example, if the
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 675.
81. Of course, the court could have reached that same result under the common law,
at least in some states. See Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 845 P2d 800 (N.M.
1992) (holding that a design contract was not in Article 2 and, thus, the UCC statute of
frauds argument was not applicable).
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licensor supplied a single master disk from which the licensee was
authorized to make thousands of copies onto its own diskettes,
could we say that the transaction's predominant purpose was to
deliver that single piece of plastic, or was the dominant purpose to
allow the making of multiple copies of the digital information? It is
difficult to conclude that anything other than the informational
rights and license were dominant.
This being said, one factor in the cases determining the
predominant purpose is whether a tangible deliverable is required.
The other facts used in the analysis are widely varied.8 2 In many
cases, courts add up the allocated cost of services and goods,
drawing a numerical comparison and giving the nod to the highest
"bidder," that is, to the items attributed with the bulk of the
contract cost. In other cases, courts look at the compensation
scheme; that is, whether payment is for the deliverable or for work
done in creating it. Others look to the language of the agreement
and whether it refers to services or to products, owners and
consultants or buyers and sellers, and other similar factors.
Throughout, of course, lies the goods-services dichotomy and the
role it plays in how courts approach the scope of Article 2.
Properly understood, a test that incorporates an understanding of
the separate role of information could follow a similar multifaceted
approach, but the factors would weigh differently. For example,
compensation based on delivery of completed designs or a
completed program might indicate that the deal is not
predominantly a services contract, but does not indicate whether
goods or information predominate.
2. Viewed From the Perspective of Intellectual Property and
Licensing Law
If we ask what law applies to computer information transactions
from a perspective that begins with intellectual property law and
licensing, an entirely different pattern arises. The cases here more
commonly focus on common law or intellectual property law as a
starting point and often ignore Article 2. At most, Article 2 has a
minor role and many cases on licensing do not mention it. Nor, in
82. See, e.g., Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Hoist Blow Pipe Co., 980 F Supp. 187
(W.D. Va. 1997) (use of sales language in agreement significant); Monarch Photo, Inc. v.
Qualex, Inc., 935 F Supp. 1028 (D. N.D. 1996) (comparative dollar value); USM Corp. v.
Aurthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989); Micro-Managers, Inc. v.
Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wisc. Ct App. 1988).
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most cases, should they do so. Instead of Article 2, cases dealing
with issues from the vantage of licensing and intellectual property
tend to rely on concepts from underlying property law (e.g.,
copyright, trademark, patent) and from a mixed federal-state
common law tradition.
In part, this is true because the default rules of Article 2 do not
address many of the questions that arise in this area. Thus, for
example, Article 2 gives no guidance on whether a license of one
technology extends to newly developed technologies that emerge
after the initial contract; yet that issue has been extensively
litigated in licensing law."' Similarly, Article 2 does not give
guidance on what is covered by a license to useO or what default
rules apply when there is no designation of the uses permitted or
denied.85 It does treat whether exceeding the scope of a license is a
breach of contract, infringement, or both.8 6 It does not suggest
when or whether a licensee in breach can be enjoined from using
the licensed information.87 It does not address whether a licensor
has a right to recover materials delivered under a license when the
license term ends or there is a material breach by the licensee.88 It
does not address the relationship between a licensor and a third
party who receives an unauthorized transfer of the licensed
technology.8 9 It does not discuss when a contract for continuous,
ongoing performance can be canceled for breach.90 It does not
discuss whether the transferee has a right to modify subject matter
of the contract after receiving it or who owns the modifications.9'
The fact that Article 2 does not address these and other contract
83. See, e.g., Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995); Bloom v. Hearst
Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1994).
84. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1993); SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F3d 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
if the license does not restrict use in terms of purpose or persons, any use consistent with
the number of copies permitted under the license is acceptable).
86. See, e.g., Expediters Int'l of Washington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management
Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468 (D. N.J. 1998).
87. See, e.g., Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Mark I Mktg. Corp., 925 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.N.Y 1996).
88. See UCITA § 815 (1999).
89. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elec., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y 1994).
90. See, e.g., Schoenberg v. Shapoisky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
Article 2 does deal with cancellation of a so-called installment contract, defined as a contract
calling for the delivery of goods in multiple installments, rather than at one time. See U.C.C.
§ 2-612.
91. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 704 F2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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law issues important for licensing and other transactions in
information is not surprising. The contract law paradigm in Article
2 is a sale of goods. In sales, the variety of issues addressed by
Article 2 are not and were not intended to respond to issues arising
in licensing or other transfers of information in digital or other
form. Given the different focus, it would a surprise if Article 2
reasonably addressed important issues in licensing.
However, even when both areas deal with the same issue, viewed
from the intellectual property perspective, traditional licensing law
derived with little, if any, attention to Article 2. Thus, for example,
treatises on patent and copyright licensing indicate that there are
no implied warranties of quality or performance with respect to the
licensed information.92 This idea marks a striking contrast with the
Article 2 assumption that all transactions involving merchant sellers
have an implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. 93 Yet, in
describing the rule for copyright and patent licensing, Article 2 is
seldom addressed; Article 2 rules are viewed as remote other law
not applicable to information transactions. Similarly, both Article 2
and common law discuss how damages are computed for breach,
but Article 2 damages formulas, including the rule that excludes
consequential damages for a seller, are seldom discussed in
licensing and other information contract cases.94 Licensing cases
are grounded in common law and do not follow Article 2
formulations focused on replacing or reselling a particular item (the
goods deal); information and informational rights are not linked to
a tangible item. The bases for computing damages must be
different.
92. For example, Milgrim, in a multi-volume treatise on licensing, does not discuss
implied warranties and comments, simply, "In the area of industrial and intellectual property,
however, the contract must make the law between the parties, subject only to overriding
principles of public policy." ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING 23-2 (1999). The Dratler
treatise on the law of licensing discusses only one form of implied license-that relating to
infringement and the like. See JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 10.02[2]
(1999).
93. Although treated as a core premise in some traditional fields of licensing, the idea
that there are no warranties (or warranty-like obligations) in patent and copyright licensing
transactions is true only in part. It ignores the effect of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
552, which creates an implied obligation applicable to anyone who, as part of its business,
transfers information to another in order to guide that other person's business decisions.
Also, of course, it ignores those cases that hold that software licenses (arguably copyright
licenses at their core) are within Article 2 and, thus, subject to such an implied warranty.
94. See, e.g., Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y 1974). Cf.
Krafsur v. UOP (In re El Paso Refinery, LP.), 196 B.R. 58 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 1996) (using an




One of the most significant cases in licensing in the past year
was- the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.95 DSC
involved whether a licensee of a copy of computer software
qualified as an owner of a copy of a computer program, which
would entitle it to the rights granted to such owners under Section
117 of the Copyright Act.96 The case was argued in part on the
basis that Article 2 applied to software and that, under Article 2,
title to goods passes on delivery of goods. The court paid little
attention to that issue, regarding Article 2 as beside the point.
Instead, it held that a licensee is not an owner of a copy of a
computer program if the license places restrictions on the licensee
that are materially inconsistent with ownership.97
Here was a case with which Article 2 might have been viewed as
expressly relevant. Yet, the court held that sales law did not
determine the law relating to licensing. It viewed the rights in the
information (computer program) as the relevant measure of
ownership. The court fashioned a rule of licensing law that does
not hinge on Article 2. The rule in DSC is consistent with
UCITA--ownership of the copy depends on the terms of the
license.98
In Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp.,19 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether a nonexclusive
patent license was transferable without consent of the licensor. The
court held that federal policy conflicted with state law. While state
law allowed transfer of any contract right unless the contract
forbade it or the transfer would materially harm the other party,
federal law precludes transfer of non-exclusive licenses without
consent. Federal law controls. Importantly, however, the state law
to which the court referred was common law, not Article 2. Indeed,
while Article 2 adopts a rule similar to common law on this issue,
Article 2 was not discussed and its influence was nowhere in sight.
In several cases, federal courts have asked whether copyright
law preempts state law as to when a license or a contract of
95. 170 E3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
96. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (1999).
97. See also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 E2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. U.C.I.T.A. § 502 (1999).
99. 89 F3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1984) (copyright license not transferable); In re Patient Education Media, Inc., 210
B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (nonexclusive copyright license in photographs not
transferable without consent).
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indefinite duration can be terminated. The court in Rano v. Sipa
Press, Inc.1°° held that there was a partial preemption of the state
law rule, but two subsequent courts have held that there is no
preemption. 10 1 In all of these cases, the state law rule gave the
party a right to terminate at will. In none of the cases did the court
rely on Article 2 as the source of state contract law. Common law
for licenses provided the governing rule.
In these and many other cases, when the issue is examined from
a perspective which presumes that licensing law applies unless
displaced, the influence of Article 2 is far more remote and often
entirely disregarded. From this viewpoint, the answer to the
question of "what law governs" does not begin, and seldom ends,
with Article 2.
3. Viewed From the Perspective of Specific Areas of Contract
A third way of looking at what law applies to computer
information transactions is to deal with common cases that raise
the issue. While most cases that we will discuss in this section use
a goods-centric approach that asks whether a transaction is within
Article 2, the cases indicate the complexity of the issue and how
difficult it is for courts armed with the predominant purpose test
and the services-goods dichotomy to reach reasonable results.
a. Development Agreements
Article 2 applies to contracts for specially manufactured goods as
well as to contracts for goods in existence at the time of the
contract.102 Yet, one litigated aspect of Article 2 scope is where the
agreement requires a provider to develop or design something and
deliver to the client the results of that development, sometimes
called a development contract. Even when approached from a
goods-centric perspective, the cases split. Development contracts
bring squarely into focus the goods-services distinction that drives
most of the Article 2 case law regarding scope.
The choice between treating a development contract as "goods"
or "not goods" spans many issues. The implied warranties are
different, as are the rules relating to statutes of limitations and
statutes of frauds. Also, there is an underlying difference in default
100. 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993).
101. See Konnan v. HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir 1999); Walthal v. Rusk,
172 E3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
102. See U.C.C. § 2-105(2).
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rules, such as whether title is transferred, when a contract can be
canceled, and whether a transferee can inspect the item before
deciding whether it has any obligation to pay.
The parameters are identifiable. If a purchaser contracts to
acquire a product that fits pre-existing specifications and is
ordinary goods, the contract is for goods even if the seller might
have to build the particular item for the particular agreement. On
the other hand, if the contract requires the provider to create a
design, but not construct any other deliverable, the transaction is
not within Article 2.103 Consistent with What we have said before
about the traditions of Article 2 case law, even if the design
agreement entails a license, it is likely to be described as a
contract for services. 1°4
In Incomm, Inc. v. Thermo-Spa, Inc.,10 5 for example, the court
held that a contract to design an advertising brochure was not a
contract for goods, even though the design, when completed, was
delivered in tangible form, the contract was primarily for services.
The "buyer" did not expect the advertising agency to create and
produce copies of the printed brochure, but merely a layout of a
brochure that it could take to a printer. Of course, to reproduce the
design, the "buyer" required a license. The court did not discuss
that, but concluded that a
careful review of the evidence, including the purchase order
[indicates] that this was predominately a contract for the
purchase of services. The purchase order specifies such
services as the concept, editing and contact layout. Moreover,
as discussed previously, it was implicit in the parties'
agreement that they would closely work together in producing
the brochure. 106
103. See Board of Trustees v. Kennerly, Slomonson & Smith, 400 A.2d 850 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1979) (holding that a professional engineer who was contractually responsible for the
preparation of specifications for plaintiff's fighting system and the supervision of its
installation was not subject to an action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness; the
rendering of professional services not in a routine manner, but through plans and
specifications tailored to individual requirements, so that they reflect the exercise of
professional judgment, is a personal service); Department of Transp. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 368 A2d 888 (Pa Cominw. Ct. 1977).
104. See, e.g., Minnesota Forest Prod., Inc. v. Ligna Machinery, Inc., 17 F Supp.2d 892
(D. Minn. 1998); R.J. Longo Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transit Am., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1295 (D.N.J.
1996); Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa 1991).
105. 595 A.2d 954 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
106. Incomm, 595 A.2d at 958. Compare Incomm, Inc. v. Thermo-Spa, Inc., 595 A.2d
954 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).with In re Fran Char Press, Inc., 55 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that a contract for printing advertising posters was a transaction in goods
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Viewed from an intellectual property license perspective, this
conclusion is rather bizarre since receiving the design is
meaningless unless accompanied by an express or at least an
implied license to reproduce copies of it.
There are many cases between these extremes where the results
turn on details of the contract and the court's perception of an
appropriate substantive result. Where a product is designed by the
provider and the end result delivered as a traditional type of goods
(e.g., furnace, equipment), the cases split. While many cases hold
that a contract with design and development elements and a
requirement to deliver the resulting product is a sale of goods,'07 as
many or more hold that such contracts are for services consisting
of the design and development, coupled with a permission, where
applicable, to allow use of the designed system.lts
When one focuses on cases involving development of computer
information, the same split pattern holds true. The results in
reported cases turn on details of the language of a contract or the
predilections of the particular judge. In USM Corp. v. David D.
Little Systems, Inc.,l °9 for example, a Maryland court held that a
governed by Article 2); Lake Wales Pub. Co., Inc. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So.2d 335 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a contract to compile and edit and publish was a contract
for goods); Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 458 N.E:2d 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1983) (holding that a contract for printing magazines was for goods, not services; the buyer
worked with the printer in performing the layout and service functions of setting up the
magazine, but the contract for simple printing had as its primary purpose the delivery of a
finished product and its main thrust was the purchase of goods.).
107. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 785 F2d 174 (7th Cir.
1986) (furnace); Abex Corp./Jetway Div. v. Controlled Sys., Inc., 983 F2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1993)
(ground power units); Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Hoist Blow Pipe Co., 980 F Supp. 187
(W.D. Va. 1997) (furnace); Neibarger v. Universal Coop., Inc., 486 N.W2d 612 (Mich. 1992)
(automated milking equipment).
108. See, e.g, Inhabitants of Saco v. General Elec. Co., 779 F Supp. 186 (D. Me. 1991)
(waste to energy system); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F Supp. 262 (D.
Me. 1977) (chemical recovery unit); Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 342 N.E.2d 65 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1976); Care Display, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 589 P.2d 599 (Kan. 1979) (trade show
display); Cork Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Martin Bloom Assoc., Inc., 1245, 573 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (plumbing system); Herman v. Bonanza Bldg., Inc., 390 N.W.2d 536 (Neb. 1986);
Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 845 P.2d 800 (N.M. 1992) (interior design of health
facility); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977) (electrical
distribution system designed); Allied Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Kasle Iron & Metals, Inc., 405
N.E.2d 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (pollution control equipment); Christiansen Bros., Inc. v.
State of Washington, 586 P.2d 840 (Wash. 1978).
109. 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. 1989). See also Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma
Systems, Inc., 148 F3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F Supp.
1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997); Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F Supp. 235
(D. N.H. 1993); D.R Tech. Corp. v. Sherwood Tool, Inc., 751 F Supp. 1038 (D. Conn. 1990);
Systems Design & Management Info., Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit
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software development contract was a sale of goods, rather than a
services contract. The agreement referred to a program that would
substantially meet various systems specifications, but also bound
the developer to use its "best efforts" to complete the system. The
lower court had held that the contract was a services contract in
light of the reference to "best efforts" and the fact that substantial
time, skill and effort were involved in designing and creating the
program. The appellate court focused on language referring to
delivery of a turnkey system and warranties as indicating that this
was a sale of goods. In contrast, in Micro-Managers, Inc. v.
Gregory,"0 a Wisconsin court held that a software development
contract was mainly for services. Here, the court emphasized that
payment was based on hours of work and that the contract
referred to an obligation to develop and design the program.
The decisions on software development contracts are divided in
regard to whether the transaction involves goods or services."' But
what are the "goods" in such transactions? They are the diskette (if
any) on which the program was delivered or the electronic digits
that constitute the program. Clearly, neither of the transactions in
the foregoing cases emphasized acquiring the diskette. Yet, are
digits, instructions, or words similar in any respect to goods? The
answer should be no. What both courts failed to focus on was that
the purpose of the transaction was to obtain the information - the
program. This program is neither goods nor services. It is
information in digital form and, under the contract, is coupled with
transfer of a right to use that information.
b. Distribution and Franchise Contracts
In the world of goods, a distribution contract is a commitment
by a manufacturer to sell products to a distributor with the
expectation that the distributor will resell them to others in the
stream of commerce. Even if the contract restricts the distributor
on what terms or where it may resell, courts routinely hold that
Union, 788 P2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Pentagram Software Corp. v. Voicetek Corp., 1
Mass.L.Rptr. 320 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1993).
110. 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1988). See also Data Processing v. L. H. Smith Oil
Corp., 493 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("DPS was to act with specific regard to Smith's
need. Smith bargained for DPS's skill in developing a system to meet its specific needs.");
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Conopco, Inc. v.
McCreadie, 826 F Supp. 855 (D. N.J. 1993).
111. See cases collected in RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
6.02 (3d ed. West 1997).
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such agreements are contracts for the sale of goods."2
Accepting this sterile transaction as a model epitomizing a sale
of goods, there are many cases where distribution contracts do not
fall within Article 2, even if the subject matter includes goods. One
is where the "distributor" acts as the agent of the manufacturer,
compensated based on a commission for goods sold.113 Such
agreements are services contracts. 4
Another circumstance is a franchise agreement. In a typical
franchise, there is much more going on than simply the delivery of
completed goods for resale. Intellectual property issues are
implicated by reliance on a license of a trademark. Many reported
cases hold that a franchise contract is not predominantly a sale of
goods and, because it is "not goods," that Article 2 does not
apply.1 5 The court in Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc.16 emphasized
the complexity of the relationship in holding that the agreement
was not a transaction in goods, but other courts have reached the
same conclusion without dealing with as complex a relationship.
We need not pause long over the question whether the
franchise agreement and the relationship of the parties
involved a transaction in goods. Certainly, the agreement
required the plaintiffs to purchase goods from Dairy Mart....
However, the franchise agreement dealt with many subjects
unrelated to the sale of goods by Dairy Mart. About 70% of the
goods the plaintiffs sold were not purchased from Dairy Mart.
Dairy Mart's profit was intended to come from the franchise
fee and not from the sale of items to its franchisees. Thus, the
112. See, e.g., Heating & Air Specialists, Inc. v. Jones, 180 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 1999);
Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1991); Intercorp, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 877 E2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1989); Paulson, Inc. v. Bromar, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1329
(D. Haw. 1991); Thermal Sys. of Alabama, Inc. v. Sigafoose, 533 So. 2d 567 (Ala 1988); Boyd
v. Oscar Fisher Co., Inc., 210 Cal.App.3d 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); but see, e.g., Lorenz Supply
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 358 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1984).
113. See, e.g., Zeno Buick-GMC, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach, 844 F Supp. 1340 (E.D.
Ark. 1992); Buttorff v. United Elec.Lab., Inc., 459 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1970); Simcoe v. Huszar, 27
UCC Rep. Serv. 627 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. 1979).
114. Cf. Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Ace Engineering Co.,
Inc., 525 N.W2d 217 (Minn. 1974) (contract was a transaction in goods).
115. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Watson, 69 E3d 36 (5th Cir. 1995) (UCC obligation of
good faith does not apply to a franchise contract, which is not a transaction in goods);
Wagstaff v. Protective Apparel Corp., 760 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1985) (distributorship
agreement not within the UCC); Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F2d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 1979);
Lorenz Supply Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 358 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1984) (franchise
distributorship not a transaction in goods); Stewart v. Lucero, 918 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1996).
116. 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980).
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sale of goods by Dairy Mart to the Zapathas was, in a
commercial sense, a minor aspect of the entire relationship.
We would be disinclined to import automatically all the
provisions of the sales article into a relationship involving a
variety of subjects other than the sale of goods, merely
because the contract dealt in part with the sale of goods. 1 7
The court did hold that UCC concepts of unconscionability and
good faith could be applied by analogy, thus concluding that these
concepts are at least in part an aspect of the common law in that
state.
118
Franchise and similar arrangements are also licenses of rights.
This takes these arrangements out of the simple model of sale of
goods under Article 2. For example, in Alesayi Beverage Corp. v.
Canada Dry Corp.,"19 the agreement, styled in part as a license,
required the licensee to establish a soft drink bottling plant and to
purchase soft drink extract from Canada Dry. The court held that,
while there were sales of goods involved, they were incidental to
the other activities under the agreement (characterized by the court
as services) and, thus Article 2 did not apply. The "purpose behind
the agreement was the establishment of a bottling business by
Alesayi, not just the sale of extracts from Canada Dry to Alesayi."
Similarly, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 20 an agreement for acquisition of soft drink mix,
bottling and distributing the drink was not found to be within
Article 2:
Here the contracts involved are ancient, perpetual, and involve
divisions of trademark rights, shared advertising, and the
transfer of "the business of bottling." These factors establish a
service orientation of the contracts that is much more than
"merely incidental or collateral to the sale of goods." In
reaching this conclusion, the court is mindful of the principle
that the "scope of coverage of 'goods' is not to be given a
narrow construction but instead should be viewed as being
broad in scope so as to carry out the underlying purpose of
the Code of achieving uniformity in commercial transactions."
117. Zapatha, 408 N.E.2d at 1374-75 (internal footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 1380. On applying these concepts by analogy to a franchise arrangement, see
also Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (employing
UCC concepts as part of the common law).
119. 947 E Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
120. 696 F. Supp. 57 (D. Del. 1988).
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Indeed, it would be disingenuous to contend that the subject
contracts do not involve the sale of "goods" within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 2-102. Nevertheless, the importance of the
non-sales aspects of the contracts mandates the conclusion
that the contracts fall outside the coverage of the U.C.C.121
The results of the cases are mixed in the context of computer
information (software) contracts involving a right to distribute the
product. We earlier discussed Advent Systems Limited v. Unisys
Corp.,122 where the court wrongly equated software with a diskette
and held that when a program is copied onto a disk, it becomes
software (i.e., the disk itself). Advent Systems involved an
agreement in which the distributor was authorized to market the
software. The court held that this was a transaction in goods. The
case did not involve a license to make additional copies of the
software-only to distribute/market them.
In contrast, the court in Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems,
Inc.12' held that a software distribution license was not a
transaction in goods, but a transaction predominantly focused on a
license of rights. The contract involved an agreement to create
modified software in which the copyright would be held by the
licensor, and the transfer of an exclusive license to use, copy and
distribute the software commercially. Copying and distribution, of
course, are exclusive rights under copyright law. The court noted:
The [agreement] provided for two licenses. Under the first
license, Architectronics granted CSI the right to use its-
DynaMenu software prototypes for joint venture-related
purposes only. That license gave CSI a tool necessary for the
development of the "Derivative Work," a new display driver.
Under the second license, CSI granted Architectronics and
CADSource the right to use, copy, and distribute the
"Derivative Work." That license was the centerpiece of the
transaction, because it provided Architectronics and
CADSource with the valuable right to manufacture the new
display driver and sell it to the public. Architectronics and
CADSource bargained primarily for the right to mass market
the product, not for the right to install single copies of the
display driver onto their own PCs. CSI's upside in the deal
121. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtoum, Inc., 696 F Supp. at 60.
122. 925 F2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
123. 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
2000
Duquesne Law Review
also was linked to the rights to reproduce and distribute: the
parties anticipated thousands of sales of the new product, and
Architectronics and CADSource promised to "pay CSI a
$20-per-copy royalty on those sales. CSI stood to gain in
royalties a sum that would dwarf the $2,000 development fee.
Because the predominant feature of the SDLA was a transfer
of intellectual property rights, the agreement is not subject to
Article Two of the UCC.
24
c. Contracts for Licenses of Information
Most cases dealing with contract licenses of information
(including computer information) do not refer to Article 2 or reject
it, but rely on common law and rules deriving from intellectual
property law.
125
This is also true even when the issue is a question of the
appropriate scope of Article 2.126 For example, in MaUin v.
University of Miami,127 the court held that Article 2 did not apply
to an agreement for the publication of a book manuscript. It noted:
There is no need for extensive discussion. This transaction did
not involve a sale of goods by the publisher to the author. The
publisher agreed to perform services. The only sales to be
made were those which it was contemplated would be made
by the sale of books when published, by the publisher to
persons who would buy the books from it. Therefore the fact
that the number of books to be published was not specified in
the publication contract was not material, and furnished no
basis to hold that the contract was unenforceable [under the
statute of frauds in Article 2].128
124. Architectronics, 935 F. Supp. at 430.
125. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
126. See, e.g., William B. Tanner Co., Inc. v. WIO, Inc., 528 F2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975)
(deciding without discussion that a license for vocal and instrumental recordings to be used
on the air cannot be characterized as a "transaction in goods" within Article 2); Snyder v.
ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Incomm, Inc. v. Thermo-Spa, Inc., 595 A.2d
954 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991). Cf. Miller v. Newsweek, 660 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1987) (leaving
unanswered the questiori of whether a contract between a photographer and a magazine
regarding submission of negatives for possible publication was governed by Article 2 or by
common law).
127. 354 So.2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Stewart v. Lucero, 918 P2d 1
(N.M. 1996) (holding that a license giving a right to conduct a catalogue business using the
name of a major retail company was not goods, but an intangible).
128. MaUin, 354 So.2d at 1229.
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In Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane,129 the Second Circuit
held that a contract for a non-exclusive license to use a customer
service training program for which the employee held the copyright
was a contract for intangible personal property, not a contract for
the sale of goods or a contract for services. This was not a
contract for the sale of goods, even though it involved the purchase
of books, manuals, and other tangibles essential to use the
program. The court described its analysis in the following terms:
Here, "title" to [the program] was hardly "a mere incident" of
Grappo's contract with Alitalia; it was its heart and soul.
Without a license to use [it] the contract would have been
useless to Alitalia. While Grappo may have tailored the
program to Alitalia's needs, those efforts were plainly
secondary to the contract. As Grappo himself states in his
complaint, the contract was for a non-exclusive license to use
[the training program]. Indeed, the. .. invoice Grappo sent to
Alitalia specified that Alitalia had been granted a
"non-exclusive, unlimited license" for . . . .the customized
version.
Alternatively, Grappo argues that the contract was not for the
sale of personal property . . . but for the sale of "goods"
(training manuals and materials) .... We reject this argument
for the same reason that we reject the proposition that the
alleged contract was one for services: the sale of a
non-exclusive license for copyrighted material was the core of
the contract. The manuals would have been useless to Alitalia
absent a legal right to use them.
130
Even though it used language that an intellectual property lawyer
would find awkward (e.g., sale of a license and title in a license),
this court recognized a point made throughout this paper. The
dichotomy between goods and services is a false one. Here, the
relevant focus was neither goods nor services. It was the right to
use the copyrighted information. This being said, the result of the
court's analysis is one that intellectual property lawyers would find
strange. The license was not governed by Article 2, but by the
statute of frauds in Article 1 of the UCC, which applies to the sale
of personal property other than goods.'3 ' The analytical flaw here
129. 56 E3d 427 (2d Cir. 1995).
130. Grappo, 56 F3d at 432.
131. Cf. Respect Inc. v. Committee on Status of Women, 781 F Supp. 1358 (N.D. III.
2000
300 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 38:255
was to assume that a license was a sale.
In contrast, a number of courts have held that Article 2 applies
to licenses of computer software. Most of these decisions use a
predominant purpose test where the transaction involves both
hardware and computer software. 132 In these mixed transactions,
courts seem inclined to follow a goods-centric impulse and
incorporate software licenses into law governing the sale of goods.
Other cases use Article 2 ideas by analogy.13
Beyond this, some cases that approach the issue from a
perspective centered on Article 2 apply Article 2 to a software
license even if no hardware is involved in the transaction.'3 In
most of these cases, the court asks whether the license is for
goods or for services. 35 Where there is no software development
component, this leads to asking whether obligations to install or
maintain software are the predominant purpose, a question with an
inevitable and obvious answer. But the answer is obvious only
because the framework is 'wrong. Unlike the courts in Grappo or
Cardozo, these courts fail to recognize that information can be the
1992) (contract allowing use of a sex education program was a services contract governed
by the 'common law statute of frauds and was unenforceable because the writing lacked
essential terms; purchase of books as part of the contract did not bring the transaction into
Article 2).
132. See, e.g., BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a contract to "design, fabricate, debug/test and supervise Field installation and
start up of equipment to automate [production of eyeglass lenses]" was more a contract for
goods than one for services because: (1) it was captioned "Purchase Order," (2) parties were
described as "Buyer" and "Seller," (3) it involved the sale of equipment; and (4) payment was
pegged to delivery of the equipment, not to the completion of required services); Apollo
Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 E3d 477 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the sale of goods
predominated and tort liability was therefore not available); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National
Cash Register Corp., 479 F Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979), aff'd 635 F2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980);
Synergistic Tech., Inc. v. IDB Mobile Communications, Inc., 871 F Supp. 24 (D. D.C. 1994);
Neilson Business Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo V. Monteleone, M.D., PA., 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987)
(holding that a turnkey hardware and software system was a contract for the sale of goods);
Design Data Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 503 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 1993); Dreier Co., Inc. v.
Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986); Delorise Brown, M.D., Inc. v. Allio, 620
N.E.2d 1020 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
133. See, e.g., Angus Medical Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 840 P2d 1024 (Ariz. 1992);
Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 1981 WL 138012 (D. Mass. 1981).
134. See, e.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); NMP Corp.
v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997); Systems Design &
Management Info., Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Pentagram Software Corp. v. Voicetek Corp., 1 Mass.L.Rptr. 320 (Mass.
Super. 1993); Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Camara v.
Hill, 596 A. 2d 349 (Vt. 1991).
135. See, e.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Systems
Design & Management Info., Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788
P.2d 878 (Kan. App. 1990); Camara v. Hill, 596 A.2d 349 (Vt. 1991).
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focus of the transaction and that information forms a third element
necessary to fill out the false dichotomy of goods-services.
Not all courts make this mistake.
136
Nevertheless, we have a curious and unsettling conflict. Courts
using the Article 2 framework apply Article 2 because software is
not "services." On the other hand, courts that approach the issue
not tethered to a goods-centric focus typically conclude that
common law governs. For example, they would say that ownership
of a copy of a computer program is determined by the restrictions
a license places on the licensee, while Article 2 would judge title
based on delivery of the copy.137 The question of what is the
applicable law, here as elsewhere, is uncertain and grounded in
conflicting perspectives.
d. Data and Data Processing Contracts
Commercial transactions in data and data processing are an
important facet of the information economy; cases dealing with
contract issues relating to this subject matter generally do not use
Article 2 to determine contract rights. The subject matter is either
services or information. It is "not goods."
In Rosenstein v. Standard and Poor's Corp.,1 38 the contract was a
license allowing a commodities exchange to use the Standard &
Poor's index as a basis for trading on the exchange. On one day,
Standard & Poor's miscalculated the index number. Persons harmed
by trading based on that error sued. The issue presented was
whether the plaintiffs could bring a claim for economic loss under
theories of negligence. Neither side argued that Article 2 applied,
but one issue raised by the defendant was that the information (the
number) was a "product" and that the concept barring recovery in
negligence for economic loss caused by a product precluded the
claim. The court rejected this argument, holding that "while [the
index is] considered salable products, we do not believe that it
sheds its character as information used to guide the economic
destinies of others." Given that view, the court held that a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation could exist based on the
136. See Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y 1996)
(finding that the predominant purpose of a software license was to transfer intellectual
property rights, not to sell goods).
137. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a licensee was not an owner of a copy of a computer
program).
138. 636 N.E.2d 665 (111. Ct. App. 1993).
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claim that the mistake in the index calculation was caused by
negligence. However, in this case, that claim was excluded by a
contractual disclaimer.
Cases such as Rosenstein handle issues of contractual obligation
without ever referring to Article 2 concepts. The court looked to
tort law to resolve a contract issue, but never seriously asked
whether the contract was within the law of sales. This approach is
both appropriate and characteristic of many cases involving data
and data processing contracts. Thus, the court in Liberty Financial
Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp.,139 held that
a contract for online data processing was not a transaction in
goods.
In the instant case, Liberty did not bargain for reels of tape
containing computer data, but for [the provider's] skill in
putting the data on the tapes for transfer to the new Liberty
system. This was not a transaction "in goods" as contemplated
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
140
Given this holding, the client could not rely on UCC Section
2-719(2) to void a damages limitation clause. Similarly, courts have
consistently held that sales concepts are not appropriate in
contracts for the collection and description of survey data.
141
While this classification (i.e., "not goods") seems clearly correct,
it is not followed in all cases. Thus, for example, the court in Big
Farmer, Inc. v. Agridata Resources, Inc.,'42 held, with little
discussion, that a license to use a mailing list was a transaction in
goods:
Since both parties deal in the purchase and sale of mailing
lists and demographic information, both parties are merchants
as that term is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code. In
addition, since the information at issue is moveable and not
otherwise precluded from the purview of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the information may be considered goods
as defined by statute.'4
139. 670 S.W2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
140. Liberty Financial, 670 S.W.2d at 47. See also Computer Servicenters, Inc. v.
Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 443 F2d 906 (4th Cir. 1981); In re
Community Med. Center, 623 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Raffel v. Perley, 327 N.E.2d 1082 (Mass. Ct. App. 1982); WXON-TV, Inc. v.
A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
142. 581 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
143. Big Farmer, 581 N.E.2d at 789.
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As a consequence, the court applied UCC Section 2-207 to
determine whether a contract had been formed and on what terms
the agreement arose.
A similar situation exists in data-processing contracts. If a
company delivers information to a data-processing company that
processes the information and returns reports, the essence of the
transaction is data-processing services, not the tangible report. A
services contract is involved. 1" The line is less clear in reported
decisions in other situations, such as when the data processing
occurs in the client's computer. Even if processing occurs in the
licensor's system, the relationship between the software and the
service sometimes causes a court to believe that "goods" dominate.
Thus, in The Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.,45 the court held that a contract for
development of software and operation of a data processing system
over a four year period was a contract for goods. While it
recognized that the transaction combined skill, equipment,
intangibles and time, the court held that the essence of the entire
transaction was for the client to license use (by the provider) of a
software system developed for the contract. 146 The warranty and
remedy rules applicable to a sale of goods applied to this four year
contract. Similarly, in Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten
Island Hospital,4 7 the parties accepted the assumption that the
UCC applied to a contract to develop software and provide
information management systems off-site for the client. This led to
an analysis in which a decision to end the long term contract after
eighteen months because of performance problems was a proper
"revocation" of acceptance of goods under the UCC.
The issue in such cases should not be whether a court can
identify some element of goods or services in each deal, but
whether the law dealing with the sale of a television set, an
automobile, or similar transaction should apply to issues in a
multiyear relationship involving review, processing and analysis of
data. Most often, when on-going relationships are involved, the sale
144. See Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C.
1970), affd, 443 F2d 906 (4th Cir. 1981).
145. 817 F Supp. 235 (D. N.H. 1993).
146. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 817 F Supp. at 239.
147. 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D. N.J. 1992). See also St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co. v.
Research-Cottrell, Inc., 788 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a contract to design and
deliver a pollution control system was a contract for the sale of goods because the "parties




of goods model does not provide relevant guidance.
III. THE SCOPE OF UCITA
It should be quite clear from the above discussion that contract
law pertaining to information transactions, including transactions in
computer information, is a complicated mixture of various areas of
contract law that creates both uncertainty and conflicting case law.
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")
proposes to codify and make uniform part of that disarrayed body
of law. The scope of UCITA has been tailored during extended
political and substantive discussion to focus on an aspect of the
information industry and provide a coherent, codified body of
contract law for that aspect of commerce, which- is central to the
modem information age.
UCITA deals with contracts and not property rights. It thus
governs agreements that pertain to computer information on
matters addressed by contract law, but does not create or alter
property rights law.148 For transactions to which it applies, UCITA
follows the general traditions of the UCC and United States
contract law in holding that, with very limited exceptions, the rules
in UCITA are background that can be varied by agreement.
4 9
Within that framework, the Act incorporates various general law
concepts such as the doctrine of unconscionability and that
148. U.C.I.T.A. § 105(a) specifically refers to the obvious point that, when applicable,
conflicting federal law preempts any conflicting provision of UCITA. Section 114 provides
that various common law doctrines supplement and are not displaced by the Act, including
specifically, the law of trade secrecy. The treatment of these and several related issues has
been controversial in large part because one aspect of the new economy is that
informational property rights law has been moved into the center of economic activity and a
number of people are concerned about the relationship between that property law and
contract law in the new economy. See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of Information
Licensing, 36 Hous. L. REv. 61 (1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation
Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECHN. LJ. 827 (1998); Mark
A. Lemley, The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALiF. L REV. 111
(1999); David Nimmer, et. al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALiF. L REV.
17 (1999); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual
Property and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of Law, 82 IowA L REv. 1137 (1997). On the
treatment of this issue in modem courts, see, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies,
Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
149. U.C.I.T.A § 113 (1999). This section lists the only provisions of UCITA the effect
of which cannot be modified by agreement; foremost are doctrines of unconscionability,
good faith, fundamental public policy invalidation of terms, and protections for the
mass-market licensee.
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contracts require good faith in performance. 1'0 It provides sorely
needed clarity on questions about choice of law, contract formation
and the manner of contracting in the Internet. It provides a blended
implied warranty structure which recognizes the idea of
merchantability as a warranty applicable to computer programs,
but provides tailored treatment for what obligations are incurred
with respect to published informational content. 151 It sets out
default rules tailored to the idea of information as the subject
matter and a license as the primary type of contract, rather than
the rules of Article 2 dealing with a model of the sale of tangible
goods.
The point of this article is not to focus on substantive rules, but
on what body of law applies to computer information transactions.
With respect to UCITA, this turns us to the scope of the Act. The
scope of UCITA hinges on its definition of "computer information
transaction" and on application of certain listed exclusions from
the scope of the Act.
"Computer information transactions" are agreements that deal
with creation, modification, access to, license, or distribution of
computer information as the subject matter of the agreement.
52
"Computer information means information in electronic form which
is obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a
form capable of being processed by a computer. The term includes
a copy of the information and any documentation or packaging
associated with the copy."1'
The governing principle is that, in a computer information
transaction, the transferee seeks the information and the
contractual rights to use it. Unlike a buyer of goods, the purchaser
(e.g., buyer, lessee, or licensee) of computer information has little
interest in the diskette or tape after the information is loaded into
a computer unless the information remains on that media and
nowhere else. In online use and distribution of computer
information, there is often no tangible medium at all. As we have
seen, courts dealing with the scope of Article 2 often wrongly
150. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 111, 114 (1999).
151. U.C.IT.A. §§ 403, 404 (1999). See also Wmter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1991); Gilmer v. Buena Vista Home Video, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Ark. 1996).
152. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(11) (1999). The Act further elaborates that it does not apply to
transactions simply because the parties elect or agree to communicate about the contract by
means of computer information systems, such as e-mail. The idea here is that the subject
matter of the transaction itself must be computer information.
153. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(10) (1999).
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assume that the two characteristic types of contracts are a sale of
goods or a transaction in services. That dichotomy is not
sustainable in the information age, where digital and other
information and rights in it are often the main part of the
transaction. Some courts have already recognized that this is so.16
UCITA expressly rejects the idea that one can describe modem
commerce in terms solely of goods and services.
A. Specific Transactions Within UCITA
UCITA thus deals with a variety of transactions at the center of
the modem information economy. It applies when the contractual
subject matter is computer information, whether that information
entails text, images, data, programs, or other computer information.
However, the mere fact that communications about a transaction,
such as an application for a loan or employment, are sent or
recorded in digital form does not place the transaction within
UCITA. Thus, a contract for airplane transportation is not a
computer information transaction even though the ticket is in
digital form. The subject matter is not the computer information,
but the service - air transportation. A contract to create and
publish a print book is not a computer information transaction
even though the author chooses or is required to deliver the work
product on a computer diskette. Yet, there are many types of
transactions that are squarely within UCITA.
1. Contracts to Create or Develop Computer Information
UCITA applies to contracts to develop, modify, or create
software and other computer information, such as a computer
database. Except as excluded in Section 103(d), it thus covers all
development contracts. As we have seen, what contract law applies
to such agreements today is difficult to answer in advance of
litigation. UCITA eliminates the uncertainty, by covering the
contract whether or not a court might treat the transaction as
services or as goods under current case law. Of course, UCITA
does not alter copyright rules relating to "works for hire" which
determine ownership of the copyright in the work that has been
developed. 16
154. See, e.g., Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y
1996); Stewart v. Lucerno, 918 P2d 1 (N.M. 1996).
155. This law generally assumes that the copyright ownership remains in the creative
developer unless either the work constitutes an employee work for hire, or the written
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Some development contracts are excluded, however. These have
to do with contracts to develop, create or produce motion pictures,
sound recordings, or broadcast programs, or contracts for freelance
news reporting. 15 The judgment was that, for these industries,
upstream contracts are sufficiently different from transactions in
the computer information industries as to suggest that it was not
desirable to develop a single, uniform body of default rules that
would cover them. 157 The parties to such contracts are able, if they
choose, to opt into coverage of their transaction by UCITA. 158
2. Transactions in Computer Programs
UCITA applies to transactions involving the distribution of, or
grant of a right to use, a computer program. These transactions are
within the Act whether they involve a license of the program or an
unrestricted sale of a copy of a program. The difference between a
license and an unrestricted sale of a copy, however, is relevant; as
reflected in various provisions of UCITA, a license may involve
either a more substantial retention of rights by the licensor, or a
greater transfer of rights, than in an unrestricted sale. 5 9 Most
provisions of UCITA apply to both unrestricted sales and licenses,
but some are limited solely to licenses. 16°
3. Access and Internet Contracts
UCITA covers "access contracts." Section 102 defines an access
contract as: "a contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or
information from, an information processing system of another
person, or the equivalent of such access."16' The model is an online
Internet or other online service site providing information
resources, but the term also includes outsourcing and similar
contract expressly conveys the copyright to the client. See, e.g., Community for Creative
Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Aynes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2nd Cir. 1992);
MacLean Assoc., Inc. v. William M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.
1991).
156. U.C.IT.A. § 103(d) (1999).
157. See generally Holly K Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. LREv. 121
(1999).
158. U.C.I.T.A. § 104 (1999).
159. See, e.g., U.C.I.T.A. § 502 (1999) (ownership of a copy in a license). See also DSC
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding
that a licensee was not an owner when the license placed restrictions that were inconsistent
with ownership).
160. See, e.g., U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (1999) (self-help repossession).
161. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(1) (1999).
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contracts. It includes systems for access to or use of computer
information on a remote information processing system.
162
Under current law, these contracts are generally governed by
common law rules. 1'> This common law is underdeveloped,
uncertain and non-uniform. A primary goal of UCITA is to provide a
coherent template for contracting online. This template includes
rules that validate use of electronic signatures and electronic
records in lieu of paper records.164 However, it goes beyond those
issues and provides coherent guidance as to how contracts can be
formed online and under what circumstances activities of
electronic agents can form or perform a contract attributable to the
person using the electronic device for that purpose. 65 Detailing
these provisions is beyond the scope of this article, but the point is
that coverage of this new context for commerce is a central feature
of UCITA.
4. Multimedia Works
UCITA applies to agreements to create or distribute digital
multimedia works. Multimedia products are those which, through
digital technology, involve an integration of multiple forms of
authorship and multiple types of information into an integrated,
often interactive work.166
5. Data and Data Processing Contracts
As we have seen, case law about what law applies to data and
data processing contracts is not consistent.' 67 While many courts
recognize that data is not equivalent to goods, some apply Article 2.
Some courts treat data processing contracts as services
agreements, while others view them as transactions in goods, at
162. UCITA does not cover broadcast or similar distribution of programming, motion
pictures, sound recordings or the like. U.C.IT.A. § 103(d) (1999).
163. See, e.g., Ticketron Ltd. Partnership v. Flip Side, Inc., No. 92-C-0911, 1993 WL
214164 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1993).
164. U.C.IT.A. § 107 (1999).
165. An electronic agent is "a computer program, or electronic or other automated
means, used by a person to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or
performances, on the person's behalf without review or action by an individual at the time of
the action or response to the message or performance." U.C.IT.A § 102(a)(27) (1999). See
U.C.I.T.A. § 206 on the effect of using such agents to form a contract.
166. For a discussion of what a multimedia work is, see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFMCE,
COPYRIGHT OICE CIRCULAR (MULTIMEDIA CIRCULAR) (1998).
167. See supra notes 126-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of data
processing contracts.
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least where the agreement involves software provided for the
processing service. UCITA resolves this conflicting precedent and
applies generally to all contracts for computer information data and
for computer data processing.'6
6. Distribution Contracts for Computer Information
Case law on distribution and franchise agreements is split.
However, the better reasoned cases exclude distribution
agreements from Article 2 when a primary basis of the arrangement
lies in a license of intellectual property rights, such as a trademark
or a copyright. In contracts for distribution of computer
information, whether made explicit or not, allocation of intellectual
property rights is frequently a principle underlying feature of the
contract. UCITA resolves the conflict, covering all contracts for
distribution of computer information within the single law.
B. Specific Transactions Outside UCITA
The scope of UCITA is limited by the definitions of "computer
information" and "computer information transaction," as well as by
the exclusions stated in subsection (d). As a result of these two
factors, UCITA leaves unaffected all transactions in the traditional
core businesses of non-digital information industries (e.g., print,
motion picture, broadcast, sound recordings). Contract rules
applicable to print works are outside UCITA, as are the following:
" Sales or leases of goods
" Casual exchanges of information
" Employment contracts 169
" Compulsory licenses17°
" Contracts where computer information is insignificant
" Computers, televisions, VCR's, DVD players, or similar goods
" Financial services transactions 7'
" Motion pictures, sound recordings, musical works'72
" Broadcast or cable programming173
Some exclusions arise from the definition of scope that we have
already discussed, but several are grounded in specific exclusions
168. U.C.i.T.A. § 102(a)(1)(11)(40) (1999).
169. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(d)(4) (1999).
170. U.C.IT.A. § 103(d)(3) (1999).
171. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(d)(1) (1999).
172. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(d)(2) (1999).
173. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(d)(2) (1999).
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stated in UCITA Section 103(d). These are based on a judgment
that rules of UCITA should not apply to transactions in the
excluded subject matter unless the parties so agree, because the
excluded transactions are different in type from those covered by
UCITA or are extensively covered by other contract law or
regulations.
1. Core Financial Functions
Section 103(d)(1) excludes "financial services transactions."74
This refers to various core banking, payment, and financial services
activities. The affirmative exclusion for these transactions was
based on the fact that other, settled law should govern these
transactions. Because financial services transactions are similar in
many ways to computer information transactions, an explicit
exclusion is desirable to avoid confusion and litigation.
While both computer information transactions and financial
transactions are often based on digital symbols and share some
common legal issues, financial transactions should often be
governed by different rules in that, in many cases, the digital
subject matter of a financial transaction is the value it
represents.7 5 Also, core financial services practices are subjects of
other mature bodies of law.
2. Core Entertainment and Broadcast
Section 103(d)(2) excludes certain agreements relating to motion
pictures, musical works, sound recordings, enhanced sound
recordings, and broadcast and cable programming. The exclusion
covers the traditional core activities in these industries. The
exclusion includes creation or distribution of these works in digital
form. It is comprehensive as to core activities and leaves liability,
contract formation, and other issues to general contract law as
applicable.
The terms "motion picture," "sound recording," "musical work,"
and "phonorecord" have the meanings associated with those terms
in the Copyright Act and registration system. 76 These distinctions
are generally followed in UCITA. For UCITA, the term "motion
174. U.C.I.T.A. § 102 (1999) (financial services transaction).
175. U.C.C. § 8-501(b)(1) (1998).
176. U.C.I.T.A also excludes "enhanced sound recordings," a state law contract concept
that extends to sound recordings in digital form where the copy of the recording contains a
program or other limited material.
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picture" focuses on linear works and does not include an
interactive computer game, multimedia product, or similar work,
nor does it include audiovisual effects within such interactive
works.
3. Voluntary Use of Computer Information
Under Subsection (d)(5), an agreement is not brought into UCITA
merely because one party elects to use computer information to
transmit information to the other when not required to do so. For
example, an author that contracts to submit an article to a
publisher for publication in a print journal and elects to send the
submission by e-mail, does not thereby bring the contract into
UCITA. A developer required to deliver information in a form other
than as computer information, does not bring the transaction
within UCITA merely by electing to develop the product using
digital systems.
Similarly, if the form of the information as computer information
is insignificant, UCITA does not apply. This is a narrow exception
applicable only where the form of the information as computer
information, as compared to the information itself, is trivial. The
exception does not ask a court to compare the cost or value of the
computer information to the cost or value of the overall
transaction. For the exception to apply, what must be insignificant
is the fact that the information is in the form of computer
information as contrasted to another form, such as in written form.
If the information could not be provided in any other form under
the agreement and still fulfill the purpose of the agreement with
respect to it, the form can never be insignificant, such as where the
computer information is an operating computer program system.
This is true even if the operating software is provided as part of a
transaction involving goods that in cost far exceed the value of the
operating system. To function as an operating system under the
agreement, the form can never be insignificant. Similarly, if a party
acquires a billion dollar robotics system involving robots and
computers along with software that operates each, the fact that the
price of the software is small as compared to the billion dollar total
deal does not support exclusion under this subsection. Rather, the
form of the information as computer information in this transaction
is essential to the agreement and not insignificant because the
software must be in a form to operate the computer and robots.
Insignificance focuses on the particular subject matter and its form,




As we have seen, an issue in the relationship between sales of
goods law and other bodies of contract law focuses on how to deal
with so-called mixed transactions. The courts in determining
whether to apply Article 2 have struggled with this concept, not
always effectively. However, a fact of modern commerce is that
virtually all contracts are governed by multiple contract laws. The
issue is not whether this will occur, but what law applies. The
treatment of this issue is outlined in UCITA Section 103(b) and (c).
1. Computer Information and UCC Subject Matter
Although they intermittently disregard it, courts dealing with
mixed transactions as an issue of the scope of UCC Article 2
routinely apply the predominant purpose test. We have already
discussed the difficulties of applying that test under current law.
The salient feature of the test, however, is not simply that it leads
to significant uncertainty, but that it always results in applying
wrong law to some part of a transaction. That is, the part of the
transaction which is different from the part that is the predominant
purpose is subjected to rules that are not designed for that type of
subject matter.
This is not a generally appropriate rule where both bodies of
contract law are stated in a relatively coherent and uniform
manner. Instead, UCITA allows each body of law to govern with
respect to its own subject matter. Thus, the general rule is that, if a
transaction includes computer information and subject matter
governed by an article of the UCC, in the absence of contrary
agreement, the UCC rules apply to its subject matter and the
UCITA rules apply to its subject matter.
17
Given the background of contract law in reference to information
transactions that we have discussed in this article, the primary
issue concerns the relationship between UCITA and Article 2 (and
Article 2A). The basic rule remains that each law applies to its own
subject matter. In general, for goods and computer information, the
two sources of contract law do not overlap since computer
information and informational rights are not goods. 17 8 The law
177. U.C.I.T.A- §§ 103(b)(1), (c), (d)(6) (1999). When there is a conflict between UCITA
and Article 9 of the UCC, Article 9 controls.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 136 F3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998); Fink v. DeClassis
745 F Supp. 509, 515 (N.D. Il. 1990) (explaining that trademarks, tradenames, advertising,
artwork, customer lists, sales records, unfulfilled sales orders, goodwill, and licenses are not
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applicable to an issue depends on whether the issue pertains to
goods or to computer information.
There are exceptions to this approach. For purposes of UCITA,
the medium that carries the computer information is treated as a
part of the computer information and within UCITA, whether it is a
tangible object or electronic in nature. UCITA applies to the copy,
documentation, and packaging of computer information. 17 9 These
are mere incidents of the transfer of the computer information.
In contrast, in some cases, UCITA excludes coverage of a copy
of a computer program if the copy is embedded in, and sold or
leased as part of goods, such as a copy of a computer program that
controls engine timing in a car. 80 The rules center on the nature of
the goods containing the copy and on the importance of the
program and access to it in the transaction in those goods.
First: UCITA applies to the copy of the computer program if the
goods in which the copy is embedded are a computer or a
computer peripheral. A commercial choice to distribute a program
in embedded form, rather than in a form that requires loading into
a computer or peripheral does not change the applicability of
UCITA. For example, the software for a medical imaging device
that relies on software capabilities would be within UCITA. Of
course, UCITA does not apply to the computer; it only applies to
computer information.
Second: In other cases, UCITA applies to the copy of the
program only if giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or
use of the program is ordinarily a "material purpose" of this type of
transaction. This standard looks at materiality in an objective
sense, centered on transactions of the type, rather than on the
subjective goals or intent of the particular parties. Furthermore,
materiality focuses on the particular goods in which the program is
embedded, rather than the overall transaction as a whole. Thus, the
fact that a particular program is contained in and sold or leased as
a part of goods that are a small part of a billion dollar transaction
involving many other assets does not take it out of UCITA if, as to
the particular goods or system containing the program, access to
the program is a material aspect of the deal.
In determining whether use of the program is a material purpose
"goods").
179. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(10) (1999).
180. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(b)(1) (1999). A similar issue is addressed in UCC Article 9, but the
resolution there deals with issues about creating and perfecting security interests and is not
pertinent to general contract law. It is not adopted in UCrrA
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in obtaining the goods, one relevant issue involves between whom
the pertinent part of a transaction occurs. If goods are sold by a
vendor but the buyer must obtain a license from a publisher, as to
the license between the publisher and licensee, the computer
information is clearly material. Beyond that, factors pertaining to
whether access to or use of the program is material include the
extent to which the computer program's capabilities are the
dominant appeal of the product, the extent to which negotiation
focused on that capability, the extent to which the agreement made
the program's capacity a separate focus, and the extent to which
the program is or could commercially be made separately available
apart from the goods. Materiality is ordinarily clear if the program
is separately licensed as part of or as contemplated by the
transaction. A separately licensed program for a digital camera that
enables the camera to link to a computer is within UCITA. On the
other hand, the mere fact that ordinary functions of ordinary goods
rely on a program embedded in the goods does not indicate that
program is governed by UCITA.
2. Computer Information and Subject Matter not within the
UCC
If a computer information transaction also involves subject
matter not governed by the UCC, the basic rule remains that UCITA
applies to the aspects of the agreement concerning the computer
information and informational rights, but not aspects involving the
other subject matter. However, because we are dealing here with
uncodified, often inconsistent common law contract rules, UCITA
provides that it covers the other subject matter if the computer
information is the primary purpose of the agreement.
As we have seen, variations of this test have been used for years
in cases involving goods and services. The test asks a court to
consider whether the computer information or other subject matter
(e.g., services) is the main focus. In doing so, the court should
consider the type of transaction envisioned by the parties. While
cases under Article 2 provide guidance on answering this kind of
question, it is appropriate to consider additional factors when
UCITA is contrasted to common law. Courts should consider the
extent to which the transaction as a whole corresponds to the
framework involved in computer information transactions, such as:
(1) the nature of any underlying intellectual property rights
involved, including differences in the rights provided for different
types of works; (2) the extent to which regulatory rules outside
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UCITA apply to the other subject matter; (3) the extent to which
clear allocation of liability risk is a concern; and (4) the extent to
which coverage by UCITA of the other subject matter in the
transaction will correspond to reasonable expectations of the
parties as to how the legal issues should be handled.
D. Opting in or Opting Out
UCITA Section 104 follows a general principle that the terms of
an agreement govern the relationship of the parties. Consistent
with that general rule, UCITA expressly acknowledges that, subject
to stated limitations, the parties can agree to apply or to preclude
application of UCITA to a transaction if a material part of the
transaction involves computer information, or subject matter
excluded under Section 103(d)(1) or (d)(2). The materiality
requirement does not establish a standard that asks a court to
determine what is the most significant or the primary part of a
transaction, but whether the information has significance to the
part of the transaction to which the option applies. Materiality is
not met if the computer information is a trivial or otherwise
insignificant aspect of the part of the transaction to which the
agreement applies.'18
In determining whether an enforceable agreement to opt-in or
out was formed, a court will apply the contract formation rules of
UCITA since either a material part of the agreement will involve
computer information or the parties may be uncertain regarding the
application of an exclusion.
The purpose of the right to agree on the coverage of UCITA is
two-fold. One purpose is simply to recognize that, in the modern
economy, contract choice is the governing principle. The
fundamental idea of contract law is that the parties can control the
terms of their own relationship. One way in which they can do so
is to determine by agreement what contract law governs their
relationship. Except for rules that are clearly regulatory in nature,
181. U.C.IT.A § 103, cmt. 5(f) (1999). The agreement can include opting into, or out of,
the contract formation rules of UCITA "Contract formation" rules are those rules necessary
to determine whether an enforceable agreement has been formed, whether actions are
attributed to a person, and how terms of the agreement are adopted. The parties may apply
the rules of UCITA to part but not all of their transaction if they choose to do so. For
example, a company providing financial services may enter into an electronic agreement that
enables a customer to access the company's database for the purpose of performing an
otherwise excluded transaction. The enforceability of that agreement is determined by
UCITA. The same agreement may also indicate terms and conditions regarding computer
information not excluded from UCITA. The financial transactions themselves are excluded.
2000
Duquesne Law Review
that contract choice should be enforced. In transactions that occur
in a mass market, the idea of choice may require some further
restriction to provide protection of the person with the lesser
leverage. Because of that, UCITA places greater restrictions on
mass-market contracts choosing to opt in or opt out of UCITA.1
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Second, in addition to the basic concept of contract choice, there
is a special need in the field of computer information transactions
to allow the parties to clarify the source of contract law within
which their agreement should be handled. While UCITA provides
needed uniformity and coherence for these transactions, there may
be cases in which uncertainty arises about when and in what
manner it, common law, or Article 2 governs. The ability to
contractually choose allows the parties to avoid the cost and
uncertainty that would otherwise exist in such cases.,
CONCLUSION
In a dynamically changing economy, the ability of basic contract
law to support the transactions that drive the change is important.
Yet, when the change entails a shift in the nature of the subject
matter and the type of transaction involved, the circumstances and
the natural tendency of courts and legislators to rely on old,
out-dated images and preferences creates a situation in which the
ability of underlying contract law to perform its function is
compromised.
We have seen in this article the effect of the shift and the
complex body of contract law that it produces. Our modem
economy is no longer goods-centric, but many of our judicial
opinions and academic analyses remain so. We are, instead, in an
economy in which information (especially computer information)
transactions play a central role. But these transactions are not
analogous to transactions involving the sale of goods. Nor are they
ordinary services contracts. They are an important, relatively new
focus of primary commercial transactions and it is important that
contract law shed its prior framework sufficiently to build a body
of law that supports this new type of commerce.
One source of such a new framework has been proposed in
UCITA. UCITA will not answer all of the important questions in
contract law that face us in the information age. But it provides a
182. See, e.g., U.C.I.T.A. § 104(3) (1999) ("In a mass-market transaction, any term under
this section which changes the extent to which this [Act] governs the transaction must be
conspicuous.").
Vol. 38:255
2000 Through the Looking Glass 317
firm and coherent start that can shift courts and transactional
lawyers into a context where the rules and presumptions of
contract fit the reality of modem information commerce.

